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WHAT IS FEDERAL HABEAS WORTH? 
Samuel R. Wiseman* 
Abstract 
Federal habeas review of state non-capital cases under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) is 
widely regarded as deeply flawed for producing a huge volume of costly 
litigation and very little relief. Many scholars have called for AEDPA’s 
repeal and a return to more robust federal review, but recently, several 
prominent commentators have suggested more dramatic change—
radically limiting federal habeas in exchange for more fruitful reform 
efforts. In an era of limited criminal justice budgets and an increasing 
focus on efficiency, these proposals are likely to proliferate. This Article 
lays out a needed empirical and theoretical foundation for the debate over 
habeas’s future. To date, no one has estimated how much federal habeas 
actually costs (and thus the potential savings from eliminating it), a figure 
necessary for assessing the feasibility and desirability of any radical 
reform scheme. This Article fills that gap, using available budget data, 
public records requests, and correspondence with state officials to 
estimate that figure at roughly $327 million per year.  
This sum, a tiny fraction of criminal justice spending and barely a blip 
in state and federal budgets, places recent reform proposals in a new light: 
it is possible that these proposals have failed to gain more traction 
because they would not free up sufficient funds to please either habeas 
proponents or opponents. The federal habeas system is one of the only 
mechanisms through which federal courts may reveal state violations of 
defendants’ constitutional rights, and it retains both instrumental and 
symbolic value. Further, getting rid of the watered-down version of 
individual review that remains under AEDPA would likely be difficult to 
reverse, making a more robust system harder to realize in the future. Any 
proposals to curtail this system in exchange for state reforms therefore 
have a high barrier to overcome with habeas proponents. For federal 
habeas opponents, the current federal system is not particularly costly, 
either financially or otherwise, since so few petitioners obtain relief. 
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Given the small cost of the current system, and thus the limited financial 
savings available, radical reform is probably unlikely, regardless of the 
desirability of any individual proposal. This Article therefore proposes 
more modest measures to make the current system more functional. One 
of these proposals is to ensure that federal habeas under AEDPA, despite 
statutory silence on the issue, is not blind to the quality of state 
postconviction processes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal collateral review of state convictions might not be most 
people’s first choice as a system of correcting or preventing the violation 
of constitutional rights or the conviction of the innocent. If the goal is to 
provide individual federal review of alleged federal rights abuses, why 
wait until the defendant has gone through the process of appealing his 
conviction in state court as well as exhausting his state postconviction 
remedies? The potential for needless and wasteful duplication and delay 
is obvious, and the task of reconstructing what happened at trial and 
before gets more difficult with the passage of time. And if the goal of 
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federal collateral review of state convictions is systemic oversight,1 why 
rely on prisoners for information about how state criminal justice systems 
are functioning? Prisoners almost always lack the legal training to 
identify constitutional problems, and, worse, they have every reason to 
file a federal petition—the possibility of release—and very little reason 
not to.2 The result is a “lottery” in which the federal courts are tasked with 
working through thousands of poorly drafted or documented and often 
frivolous petitions in search of a few winners.3 This approach is less 
efficient and effective than other possible approaches like setting federal 
standards for the functioning of state criminal justice systems and using 
highly skilled attorneys from the Department of Justice (DOJ) to monitor 
compliance.4 
Of course, to a large extent, federal habeas is a product of history 
rather than conscious design. The roots of the writ of habeas corpus lie in 
judicial reaction to extreme executive (royal) abuse of the criminal 
process for personal and political ends.5 In a world without a procedure 
allowing those imprisoned by the crown to challenge their confinement 
in court, habeas corpus was an excellent invention,6 and it can still be an 
effective means of addressing the most blatant government abuses.7 In 
the United States, the modern era of federal habeas began as federal 
collateral review expanded along with the Warren Court’s federalization 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 
1141 (1988) (discussing the competing “Nationalist” and “Federalist” models of judicial 
federalism).  
 2. For a fuller exploration of these problems, see infra Part III; NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH 
L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011) (describing the low levels of 
state petitioner success in habeas and the time and expense associated with numerous, largely 
unsuccessful petitions and proposing major reforms); Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, 
Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 815 (2009).  
 3. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 68 (describing habeas as a “lottery”); infra Part 
I. 
 4. See Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 
36 (2010) [hereinafter Primus, Structural Vision] (calling for the creation of new team of DOJ 
lawyers to assist habeas petitioners in asserting systemic rights violations). 
 5. See Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the 
Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 
1361, 1367 (2010) (“Habeas corpus emerged as the English writ of liberty during the 
constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century, when it was used as a remedy against political 
arrest by King Charles and his privy council.”). See generally PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS 
CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 18, 99–201 (2010) (describing how the writ of habeas corpus 
evolved to have a primary purpose of protecting against abuse of royal power). 
 6. See Proceedings on the Habeas Corpus, brought by Sir Thomas Darnel, Sir John Corbet, 
Sir Walter Earl, Sir John Heveningham, and Sir Edmund Hampden, at the King’s-Bench in 
Westminster-Hall, reprinted in 3 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 2 (1809). 
 7. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 235, 237 (2005) (granting habeas relief 
under § 2254 of AEDPA for the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge for racial reasons). 
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of criminal procedure by incorporation.8 In the face of significant 
opposition from all levels of state criminal justice systems, federal habeas 
was, again, a very useful tool for a branch of government with few other 
options.9 
Taking, then, the existence of federal collateral review of state 
convictions as a given, few people’s preferred design would likely look 
much like our current system under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).10 Along some dimensions, AEDPA can, 
perhaps, be seen as a reasonably successful compromise between the 
more robust habeas statute that it replaced and a more radical scaling back 
of federal review. It has achieved the goal of protecting states’ 
sovereignty and finality interests by reducing federal court reversals of 
state convictions while providing an avenue for federal relief in extreme 
cases,11 but little else can be said for it. Because the difficulty (for skilled 
practitioners, let alone pro se litigants) of navigating its procedural maze 
is matched only by the challenge of overcoming the deference it affords 
state court decisions, AEDPA has failed at reducing the volume, pace, or 
complexity of federal review. Nor does it provide states with an incentive 
to improve their own systems of postconviction review, as it affords 
considerable deference to state court decisions without any explicit 
reference to the quality of the processes that produced them.12 It is not 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 800–05; Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. 
Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 65, 105–06 (describing the expansion of 
federal collateral review of state convictions under the Warren Court). 
 9. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 805 (“For the Warren Court, expanding federal 
habeas review of state criminal cases served two critical functions. It provided a powerful 
incentive for the states to improve their own postconviction review processes. And it sent clear 
notice to defiant state judges that they could not thumb their noses at, or deliberately ignore, 
federal law.”). 
 10. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).  
 11. Arguably, these are the goals of federal courts, not of the enacting Congress. See Lee 
Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 445 (2007) 
(stating that “contrary to the pronouncements of the federal judiciary, the 104th Congress did not 
‘intend’ comity, finality, and federalism—at least not in any way meaningful to interpreters of 
legal texts”). 
 12. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, State Post-Conviction Remedies in the Next Fifteen Years: 
How Synergy Between the State and Federal Governments Can Improve the Criminal Justice 
System Nationally, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 298, 299 (2012) (describing pressure on states to ensure 
that their “systems provide a full and fair opportunity for the litigation of prisoners’ constitutional 
claims”); Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. REV. 953, 978–92 (2012) 
[hereinafter Wiseman, Habeas] (discussing ways of attacking state postconviction processes 
through AEDPA); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 146–66 (2012) [hereinafter Marceau, Habeas Process] (suggesting 
process-based challenges); see also Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012) (describing 
federal judges’ deference to state court decisions when reviewing state habeas cases); Trevino v. 
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even particularly well drafted—AEDPA’s sphinx-like prose has 
contributed to it being the subject of more than one hundred Supreme 
Court decisions in its short life.13  
Since the passage of AEDPA it has become increasingly clear that 
non-capital federal habeas cases—the vast majority of federal habeas 
petitions—have become less useful, as massive resistance has been 
replaced by facial compliance and undercut by chronic underfunding.14 
As groundbreaking empirical work starkly demonstrates, AEDPA has 
generated an enormous amount of litigation and very little relief.15 This 
huge volume of litigation and dreadful success rate—only 0.82% of 
petitioners obtain any sort of relief16—have changed the debate over 
federal habeas. Prior to AEDPA, for example, Professors William Stuntz 
and Joseph Hoffmann argued for greater deference to state courts on the 
grounds that federal habeas was over-deterring rights violations.17 Post-
AEDPA, Professors Hoffmann and Nancy King argue that non-capital 
federal habeas should be radically limited and the resources devoted to it 
used elsewhere because it deters too little at too high a price.18 Similarly, 
                                                                                                                     
Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917 (2013) (citing Martinez). Compare Nancy J. King, Enforcing 
Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 2428, 2449–55 (2013) [hereinafter King, 
Enforcing Effective Assistance] (arguing that Martinez will not lead to a meaningful increase in 
successful habeas petitions, and providing empirical data), with Justin F. Marceau, Is Guilt 
Dispositive? Federal Habeas After Martinez, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071 [hereinafter 
Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive?] (arguing that the Court is moving towards prioritizing fair 
procedures over innocence).  
 13. See Marceau, Habeas Process, supra note 12, at 98–101, 100 n.47 (describing 115 post-
AEDPA Supreme Court decisions as “cases of state prisoners challenging the constitutionality of 
their detention through federal habeas” and excluding executive and immigration detentions).  
 14. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, A Crisis in Federal Habeas Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
887, 900–01 (2012) [hereinafter Primus, Crisis] (reviewing KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2) 
(noting that state postconviction procedures offer little opportunity for petitioners to produce the 
evidence needed and that postconviction counsel are often inadequate); Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and 
the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 598–99 (2014); id. at 528 (arguing that the Roberts 
Court’s habeas jurisprudence “allocates relief based on a normative judgment about the degree to 
which both the state and its prisoners have complied with relevant legal norms”).  
 15. NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT 
COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE 
ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 9–10, 51–52 (2007), available 
at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf; FRED L. CHEESMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. 
FOR STATE COURTS, A TALE OF TWO LAWS REVISITED: INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF THE 
PRISONER LITIGATION REFORM ACT AND THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY 53 
(2004), available at http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/criminal/id/19. 
 16. Nancy J. King, Non-Capital Habeas Cases After Appellate Review: An Empirical 
Analysis, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 308, 309 (2012) [hereinafter King, Non-Capital Habeas].  
 17. See Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 8, at 100–01. 
 18. KING& HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 49, 74–76, 87–101 (calling for the elimination of 
most federal collateral review of state convictions because, inter alia, federal habeas review fails 
to deter constitutional violations and “is nothing more than a costly charade”). 
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Professor Eve Brensike Primus, noting the “enormous expense” of the 
current system, has proposed limiting federal review to claims of 
systemic rights violations, curtailing most federal review of individual 
cases while creating a new team of Department of Justice attorneys to 
help address structural problems.19 
Unsurprisingly, these proposals to radically restructure federal habeas 
are controversial.20 Even assuming that these reform proposals would 
survive a Suspension Clause challenge21—as they likely would—
radically curtailing the scope of federal review of state convictions raises 
important concerns. Federal habeas is undeniably important, even under 
AEDPA, to the successful petitioners who would not otherwise obtain 
relief; it also gives state court judges an additional reason to respect the 
federal constitution, and it has significant symbolic and historical value.22 
And, as many have argued, AEDPA could serve these functions more 
effectively if its onerous procedural and substantive barriers to relief were 
removed.23 It is perhaps not surprising that there appears to be little 
political appetite for repealing AEDPA, given that Congressional 
proponents of the federalism arguments that helped lead to its passage 
have grown in number and passion over the last twenty years. That may 
change in the future, however, and recreating a more robust federal 
habeas would likely be more difficult if individual review of state 
convictions is further restricted. 
Further, federal collateral review is not just a particularly unwieldy 
part of federal review of individual cases or the functioning of state 
criminal justice systems—it is one of the primary means of such 
oversight. Due to procedural and substantive limitations like the Younger 
v. Harris abstention doctrine24 and Heck v. Humphrey’s bar on § 1983 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Primus, Structural Vision, supra note 4, at 4–5, 36.  
 20. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 14, at 597–98 (arguing that Hoffmann and King’s proposed 
fiscal tradeoff is “implausible and unsustainable” and will “produc[e] systemic difficulties for the 
judiciary”); John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and 
King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 439 (2011). 
 21. Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 839, 841, 843–44; Primus, Structural Vision, supra 
note 4, at 39–40 (arguing that the Court would uphold significant limits to federal habeas as long 
as states provide adequate postconviction remedies). 
 22. See Blume et al., supra note 20, at 451–54. 
 23. See id. at 473–77 (proposing changes to the statute of limitations and other ways to 
remove barriers in federal habeas); Freedman, supra note 12, at 298–99 (interpreting current law 
to require a fair state postconviction process and, if states fail to provide this, more searching 
review of state decisions by federal courts).  
 24. 401U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (holding that “the possible unconstitutionality of a statute on its 
face does not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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claims that imply the invalidity of a conviction,25 individual federal 
review through other avenues is limited. For similar reasons, as well as 
because of the doctrines of judicial, prosecutorial, and qualified 
immunity26 and the Court’s increasingly rigorous class certification 
requirements,27 civil rights litigation under § 1983 is not as useful a tool 
for enforcing criminal procedural rights as one might hope or expect.28 
The Supreme Court takes far too few cases every year to provide more 
than a minute chance of individual review or to effectively monitor state 
courts through certiorari,29 and neither the Department of Justice nor any 
other federal agency is charged with that task.  
Legislation imposing greater federal involvement in state criminal 
justice also seems unlikely in the near future except, perhaps, as part of 
some kind of larger bargain.30 Because enforcing the rights of criminal 
defendants is rarely especially high on politicians’ agendas,31 and in light 
of the ongoing struggle over the Medicaid expansion, politicians may 
well have little appetite for further federal incursions on state 
sovereignty.32 A major shift in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
AEDPA or the Suspension Clause seems almost as unlikely.33 Although 
federal habeas review of non-capital state convictions under AEDPA may 
                                                                                                                     
 25. 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (“[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the 
district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply 
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless 
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1250–51 (2012) (holding that 
police officers had qualified immunity from damages sought in a suit alleging an invalid search 
where “no reasonable officer would have recognized” that the search was invalid).  
 27. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (reversing a 
class certification); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 (2013) (reversing another 
class certification).  
 28. See Primus, Structural Vision, supra note 4, at 47–50 (discussing problems with using 
§ 1983 to achieve reform of the state criminal justice system). 
 29. See Table A-1, Supreme Court of the United States—Cases on Docket, Disposed of, and 
Remaining on Docket at Conclusion of October Terms, 2007 Through 2011, U.S. COURTS, http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/A01Sep12.pdf (last visited 
May 1, 2015) (showing 75, 87, 82, 86, and 79 cases argued during each term in 2007 through 2011, 
respectively).  
 30. But see infra Part III (arguing that such a bargain is unlikely). 
 31. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE 
L.J. 1344, 1397 & n.237 (2014) [hereinafter Wiseman, Pretrial Detention] (listing and describing 
sources that explore the under-representation of criminal defendants in the political process).  
 32. FRANK J. THOMPSON, MEDICAID POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POLICY DURABILITY, AND 
HEALTH REFORM 167–68 (2012) (highlighting political tension over Medicaid expansion under 
the Affordable Care Act and the opposition it has faced from members of the federalist Tea Party). 
 33. Cf. Wiseman, Habeas, supra note 12, at 992–99 (arguing that a lack of adequate fact-
finding procedures in state postconviction review could give rise to a Suspension Clause violation 
if federal fact-finding is not available under AEDPA). 
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not be especially effective, eliminating it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to undo even if conditions change. So for those concerned 
about remedying individual rights violations and monitoring the 
adequacy of state procedures, federal, non-capital habeas retains 
significant practical and symbolic value.  
Nonetheless, in light of the near-universal criticism of AEDPA’s 
wasteful futility and the recent Congressional emphasis on reducing 
federal spending and intrusion into state affairs, it is perhaps surprising 
that these (or similar) proposals have not gotten more traction. In a time 
of tight state and federal budgets, a costly, ineffective system would seem 
to be an attractive target. Part of the reason that non-capital habeas 
survives under AEDPA is, as argued here, that its costs are relatively low, 
at least in the context of state and federal spending. This Article provides 
the first,34 albeit rough, estimate of what the current system of federal 
                                                                                                                     
 34. See Blume et al., supra note 20, at 468 (“Given the number of times by that point that 
Hoffmann and King have labeled habeas review a ‘waste’ of money or resources, we read 
expectantly for their estimate of the federal and state dollars waiting to be liberated by the 
elimination of noncapital habeas review—but no estimate ever appears. Nor do they attempt any 
projection of the cost to establish and operate the new federal initiative.” (footnote omitted)); 
Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 816 (generally noting federal costs likely caused by the time 
expended on habeas petitions by judges, clerks, magistrate judges, and pro se attorney staff and 
the lack of e-government rules in this area, and concluding that there is “significant expenditure 
of state dollars,” citing the number of state habeas petitions filed annually and testimony regarding 
the number of state lawyers who work on habeas cases to support the expense estimate (citing 
Hearing on Habeas Reform: the Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005: Hearing on S. 1088 Before 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2–3 (2005), available at http://www.constitutionproject. 
org/pdf/eisenberg_11_16_05_testimony.pdf)); Primus, Crisis, supra note 14, at 902–03 
(expressing skepticism that there will be many cost savings under King and Hoffmann’s proposal 
but not directly estimating costs or savings). Only rough, generalized cost estimates for habeas 
review of state cases appear to be available in the literature. See ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY 
W.K. DALEY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS, at v (Sept. 1995), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/FHCRCSCC.P 
DF (discussing the number of habeas cases and case processing times but not estimating costs); 
141 CONG. REC. S7596, S7597 (May 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1995-05-26/pdf/CREC-1995-05-26-pt1-PgS7596-2.pdf#p 
age=2 (concluding that frivolous habeas petitions cost “millions and millions of dollars” based on 
the anecdotal evidence that “[m]ost prosecutors tell me that they spend a high percentage of their 
time just answering habeas petitions”); Richard Faust, Tina J. Rubenstein & Larry W. Yackle, 
The Great Writ in Action: Empirical Light on the Federal Habeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 637, 639, 673–705 (1990–1991) (pre-AEDPA, examining how habeas 
cases “may affect the work of the federal district courts” and describing the types and timing of 
state petitioners’ federal habeas claims and counsel provided, but not estimating costs); PAUL H. 
ROBINSON, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE COURT 
JUDGMENTS 21–23 (1979), available at https://www ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/63085NCJR 
S.pdf (pre-AEDPA, noting court costs that arise as a result of state habeas petitions, including 
clerk’s office processing and creation of files, magistrate review, court hearings, state-appointed 
counsel, and state responses to requests for records and facts, but not providing specific cost 
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collateral review of state non-capital cases costs the federal and state 
governments. It analyzes data compiled from public records requests and 
online sources to arrive at a ballpark figure of $327 million per year. 
While this is, of course, a significant sum of money by most measures, it 
is a small drop in the bucket of government criminal justice spending, and 
a tiny speck in the overall budget. If this number is even roughly accurate, 
the current system of non-capital federal review might not be quite as bad 
as Professors King, Hoffmann, and Primus have suggested: even if it 
provides little relief or deterrence, it does so at what might be seen as a 
reasonable cost. 
Saying that non-capital habeas under AEDPA might be better than 
nothing at a given price certainly does not answer the question of whether 
other alternatives would be preferable.35 If these proposals can achieve at 
least some of the goals of federal habeas more efficiently, we might still 
expect them, or proposals like them, to generate Congressional interest, 
and here the relatively small expense of the current system might explain 
the lack of support for reform. Little can be surmised from Congressional 
inaction, though, especially given the increasingly sclerotic nature of the 
legislative process. And, given the recency of the proposals, it may 
simply be a matter of time before Congress revises or repeals AEDPA.  
Still, one possible explanation for the lack of Congressional interest 
in habeas reform is that the value to its proponents of retaining individual 
federal review, even in its current form, exceeds what its opponents 
would be willing to give up to drastically limit it. Individual federal 
review of state convictions under AEDPA has both instrumental and 
symbolic value, but habeas under AEDPA produces so little relief that it 
is a relatively minor burden on sovereignty interests. Eliminating 
individual federal review would mean sacrificing an important piece of 
federal oversight of state criminal justice systems unless a substitute, such 
as an expanded role for the DOJ, were offered in its place. Given the 
                                                                                                                     
estimates); Peter Sessions, Note, Swift Justice?: Imposing a Statute of Limitations on the Federal 
Habeas Corpus Petitions of State Prisoners, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1554 n.221 (1997) (in 
suggesting that federal habeas is not very costly, focusing primarily on the percentage of federal 
cases that are habeas cases—a statistic that has since increased—and not providing direct 
estimates of funds expended for habeas). Some cost estimates only address habeas costs in capital 
cases. See, e.g., Guide to Case Management and Budgeting in Capital Habeas Cases, U.S. 
DISTRICT CT., N.D. CAL., http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/caphabbugeting (last visited May 1, 
2015) (reporting hourly rates of lead counsel in capital habeas cases and the cost of paralegals and 
law clerks).  
 35. See Shawn J. Bayern, False Efficiency and Missed Opportunities in Law and 
Economics, 86 TUL. L. REV. 135, 140, 142 (2011) (observing that “[t]he general problem is that 
an activity may be efficient, productive, or wealth-producing in the narrow sense that it is better 
for it to occur than for it not to occur” but that better alternatives are often ignored (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
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interests involved, neither option seems especially likely. Thus, 
proponents’ valuation of the status quo may outweigh the value 
opponents place on further limiting its reach. Even if this is true, we still 
might expect a stronger drive to limit federal review if the current system 
generated significant monetary costs: the cost savings could make the 
deal broadly appealing. In other words, if federal habeas under AEDPA 
were costly enough, then reallocating the money towards other goals 
would create a surplus to be divided between the two sides. King and 
Hoffmann, for example, suggest using the savings to pay for indigent 
defense,36 and it might be possible to use the savings to reduce the federal 
tax burden.  
But if the cost figure calculated here is remotely accurate, the 
available savings may not be adequate to overcome opposition to 
significantly altering the status quo. These costs, moreover, will fall if the 
prisoner population, and thus the number of habeas petitions, continues 
to decline.37 Further, because judicial expenditures are relatively fixed 
and prisoner litigation has inherent problems, it would be difficult to 
generate significant savings without entirely foreclosing individual 
review.  
Thus, while they might be superior to the current regime in many 
respects, King and Hoffmann’s and Primus’s proposals may have little 
chance of success as long as the existing climate persists. And as others 
have observed, if the existing political or, more likely, judicial climate 
changes, then a more functional system of individual review may once 
again be attainable.38 Moreover, this is likely true of arguably even more 
politically appealing proposals, such as curtailing individual review in 
exchange for states adopting a package of reforms to reduce wrongful 
convictions. While such proposals are undoubtedly valuable in provoking 
thought about what habeas should look like in the future, in the short term 
perhaps the most that can be hoped for is more modest reform aimed at 
increasing federal scrutiny of state postconviction processes under 
AEDPA.39  
In a more ideal world, these issues would not come up—there would 
be the political will to invest in improved indigent defense, greater federal 
oversight of state criminal justice systems, innocence protection reforms, 
and more robust postconviction review. Nothing herein suggests 
otherwise; if anything, the relatively modest total cost of the current 
system estimated below indicates that an expanded habeas would make 
                                                                                                                     
 36. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 88, 100–01, 107. 
 37. I am indebted to Professor King for this observation.  
 38. Huq, supra note 14, at 597; Blume et al., supra note 20, at 474–78 (criticizing Hoffmann 
and King for discounting the possibility of doctrinal changes to habeas law to reduce litigation 
and increase relief). 
 39. See infra Part IV; Wiseman, Habeas, supra note 12. 
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only a small ripple in state and federal budgets. This suggests that the real 
obstacle to reform is not monetary cost, but states’ opposition to 
expanded federal involvement in their justice systems. Because AEDPA 
has dramatically limited that involvement in non-capital cases, however, 
further curtailment is unlikely to be a sufficient carrot for major reform. 
This Article has four Parts. The first provides an overview of federal 
habeas and its dysfunction, as well as of the recent proposals to 
significantly limit the scope of federal habeas in exchange for other 
reforms. Part II contains an estimate of the costs of federal collateral 
review of state non-capital cases calculated with data compiled from 
public records requests as well as online sources. This Part also includes 
an account of the non-financial sovereignty and finality interests that 
would weigh in any bargain. It then provides an account of the difficulties 
inherent in individual review that make realizing all of the potential 
savings hard to achieve without eliminating federal collateral review 
entirely. Part III then considers recent, radical reform proposals, arguing 
first that, at least when viewed in isolation, AEDPA is a justifiable use of 
resources. This Part then considers the proposals individually and the 
prospects for significant change more generally, tentatively concluding 
that the cost savings that could be generated by eliminating most federal 
review of state non-convictions would likely be an insufficient catalyst 
for reform. It concludes that, given the fairly limited impact of the current 
system on states, any realistic proposal will necessarily be rather modest. 
Part IV suggests one such reform, arguing that the Court should build on 
its recent decisions in Martinez v. Ryan40 and Trevino v. Thaler41 to focus 
on the adequacy of state postconviction processes. Although, due to the 
near-uniform frustration with the current federal habeas system, 
proposals to use its resources elsewhere have some appeal, the fairly low 
costs associated with individual federal review suggest that they may be 
both implausible and unwise. 
I.  THE FAILURES OF AEDPA AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
The writ of habeas corpus has a long and storied history, with roots 
reaching as far back as sixteenth-century England, when the king sought 
greater control over jailers’ activities.42 Although the writ originally 
                                                                                                                     
 40. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).  
 41. 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).  
 42. Remedies that partially resembled the modern writ emerged as early as the 1500s, 
although by many historical accounts the writ that reflects the same values enshrined in modern 
habeas fully emerged in seventeenth-century England. See HALLIDAY, supra note 5, at 18, 27 
(noting that in the “latter part” of the sixteenth century, justices of the King’s Bench used habeas 
corpus and that the writ was “newly invigorated in the decades around 1605” and was used to 
ensure that other jurisdictions “followed their own rules and that local customs regarding 
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strengthened royal power,43 sometimes to the detriment of prisoners, it 
grew to protect individuals against imprisonment contrary to the law.44 In 
America, this essential piece of the common law was adopted early on by 
states45 and within the federal Constitution.46 There was little 
disagreement when the Founders included a limitation on the suspension 
of the writ into the Constitution,47 aside from a lively debate over the 
details of the limit.48 After state prisoners gained access to federal habeas 
in subsequent legislation,49 federal habeas review of state convictions—
already providing an important remedy for individual injustices50—also 
                                                                                                                     
imprisonment were not repugnant to common law and common weal”); Redish & McNamara, 
supra note 5, at 1367 (explaining that “[h]abeas corpus emerged as the English writ of liberty 
during the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century”).  
 43. HALLIDAY, supra note 5, at 42–43 (describing the “period when habeas corpus came to 
be most closely attached to the king’s prerogative” and explaining that “[t]he rationale behind the 
direction of the writ . . . lay in a personal relationship: that between the king and his franchisee, 
to whom the king had delegated authority to hold people in his name so long as he did so according 
to the king’s laws”).  
 44. Id. at 197 (noting a growing conception of habeas as “help[ing] redirect law’s attention 
from liberties to imprison, to liberties of individuals not to be imprisoned”).  
 45. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U. L. 
REV. 143, 145–46 (1952) (describing the incorporation of habeas corpus into state constitutions).  
 46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 47. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 5, at 1370 (“Participants in the Convention 
debates seemed unanimous in their belief that the maintenance of a strong writ of habeas corpus 
was essential to the preservation of individual liberty.”); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: 
RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 14 (2001) (observing that “[d]iscussions of the Clause 
focused on the power of suspension rather than on the nature of the writ”); see id. at 14–17 
(explaining that although all agreed on the nature of the writ, some members of the Convention 
argued that the Suspension Clause was unnecessary because the Constitution provided that the 
federal government lacked powers not explicitly granted to it, and therefore certain members were 
concerned about the prospect of federal tyranny based on the power granted by the Clause). 
 48. FREEDMAN, supra note 47, at 14–17 (describing the debates surrounding suspension); 
Redish & McNamara, supra note 5, at 1370–74 (describing different versions of the Suspension 
Clause and different views of suspension offered by Charles Pinckney, John Rutledge, James 
Wilson, and Thomas Jefferson).  
 49. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). It is generally understood that the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
which directly established a federal writ of habeas corpus, did not allow federal judges to review 
state petitions, although some argue whether the Suspension Clause itself, or other existing law, 
provided a right to federal review of both state and federal habeas petitions. See KING & 
HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 8 (noting the “prevailing view that “the writ was available under the 
1789 act only to those held under federal authority”); JUSTIN J. WERT, HABEAS CORPUS IN 
AMERICA 31–32 (2011) (describing debates as to whether the Clause provided a habeas right or 
whether subsequent legislation was necessary); FREEDMAN, supra note 47, at 36–41 (arguing that 
“no statute of Congress was needed to give the federal courts authority to issue the writ of habeas 
corpus” and that common law and state habeas law provided this federal authority).  
 50. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742–43 (2008) (noting that “the Framers 
considered the writ a vital instrument for the protection of individual liberty”); FREEDMAN, supra 
note 47, at 12 (describing a consensus by the Founders that the writ was to “protect the liberty of 
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came to serve another important, related purpose within our federal 
system. During periods of systemic failures of justice in state courts, the 
threat of federal habeas review served as a deterrent against the worst 
abuses.51 As the Civil Rights Era drew to a close, however, critics of 
federal habeas’s impingement on state sovereignty and the inefficiency 
of its multilayered review gained prominence, ultimately leading, inter 
alia, to the passage of AEDPA, designed to streamline, and curtail, 
federal review. As Professor King, Fred Cheesman, and Brian Ostrom’s 
important empirical work has shown, AEDPA has succeeded in limiting 
successful claims but failed at reducing costs.52 With federal habeas 
review of state convictions reduced, in King and Hoffmann’s view, to a 
“costly charade,”53 they, as well as Primus, have suggested dramatic 
reform, proposing to all but eliminate review in individual cases and to 
use the recovered resources for systemic improvements.54  
A.  The Need for Change 
Habeas remains the only federal mechanism state prisoners have to 
challenge the legality of their convictions,55 and they use it frequently—
state prisoners file thousands of petitions in federal court each year.56 But 
it is widely acknowledged that federal collateral review of state criminal 
convictions under AEDPA produces a great deal of litigation yet only a 
                                                                                                                     
individuals against its possible wrongful deprivation by the government”); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & 
William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 
U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 691 (1990) (arguing “that defendants should have easy access to habeas 
review where consideration of the defaulted claim might correct an unjust conviction (or sentence 
of death), but not otherwise”); see also Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral 
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 150, 159 (1970) (noting the burden on 
federal courts as a result of voluminous state habeas petitions and arguing for a system of limited 
review).  
 51. See, e.g., KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 50 (explaining that the Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1867 was designed to protect reconstruction officials and slaves from “persecution by 
unrepentant state officials—including state judges—who refused to shift their loyalties from the 
defeated Confederacy to the ideals of equality and due process expressed in the newly enacted 
Thirteenth Amendment and recently proposed Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution”); id. at 65 (noting that the Warren Court’s “reinvigoration” of habeas in the 
1960s allowed the “lower federal courts to force recalcitrant states to obey federal law”).  
 52. KING ET AL., supra note 15, at 51–52, 54–55. 
 53. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 67.  
 54. Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 822–23; see also KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, 
at 87–107; Primus, Structural Vision, supra note 4, at 5.  
 55. See, e.g., Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2011) (“Habeas is the exclusive 
remedy . . . for the prisoner who seeks immediate or speedier release from confinement.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 56. KING ET AL., supra note 15, at 9–10 (“Each year, more than 18,000 cases, or one out of 
every 14 civil cases filed in federal district courts, are filed by state prisoners seeking habeas 
corpus relief, and more than 6000 of those cases reach the courts of appeals.”).  
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small amount of relief.57 As introduced above, many prisoners enter its 
maze of procedural barriers and deferential standards of review, but few 
will win: “The percentage of these petitioners receiving any sort of relief 
in federal court seven or eight years after filing, considering both district 
and circuit court review, is just 0.8 percent.”58 
With this abysmal success rate, federal habeas for state petitioners no 
longer provides a meaningful opportunity for correcting wrongs in 
individual cases. Nor does it do much to encourage state level systemic 
improvements such as more accurate investigative procedures or better 
representation of indigent defendants. AEDPA grants deference to state-
court factual and legal conclusions almost without regard to the process 
that produced them, removing any federal incentive for improved state 
postconviction procedures.59 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected 
the notion that avoiding federal habeas review motivates state courts.60 
The futility and expense of the current system have led to proposals, 
taking up the suggestion of earlier commentators, to seriously curtail 
federal review of state convictions and shift the resources currently spent 
on federal habeas to improve state criminal processes.61  
  
                                                                                                                     
 57. See, e.g., KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 68 (arguing that federal habeas is “wholly 
incapable of producing any substantial increase in the enforcement of federal constitutional 
rights” and will “never” meaningfully impact state courts, police, or lawyers); Primus, Structural 
Vision, supra note 4, at 1 (“Experts have described the current system as ‘chaos,’ an ‘intellectual 
disaster area,’ ‘a charade,’ and ‘so unworkable and perverse that reformers should feel no 
hesitation about scrapping large chunks of it.’” (footnotes omitted)); Larry W. Yackle, State 
Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 541, 
542 (2006) (describing the federal habeas system as being “in chaos”).  
 58. King, Non-Capital Habeas, supra note 16, at 310. 
 59. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012) (allowing a federal grant of state habeas relief only 
if the state adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court”).  
 60. See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011) (“Opinion-writing practices 
in state courts are influenced by considerations other than avoiding scrutiny by collateral attack 
in federal court.”). 
 61. Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 2507, 2526 (1993) (questioning “the relative usefulness of habeas corpus as a means of 
ensuring adequate protection of federal constitutional rights in state criminal trials”); Friendly, 
supra note 50, at 148 (describing how collateral attack has become “a gigantic waste of effort”); 
see also PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 106 (1976) (arguing for the unification 
of the state review processes to more efficiently manage judicial resources); James S. Liebman, 
Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 333–42 (2002) (proposing a trade 
of narrower federal and state postconviction review for “trial and direct appeal protections”); Paul 
H. Robinson, Proposal and Analysis of a Unitary System for Review of Criminal Judgments, 54 
B.U. L. REV. 485, 485 (1974) (concluding that postconviction remedies “fall short of achieving 
adequate fairness and comprehensiveness”).  
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B.  Recent Resource-Shifting Proposals  
Recognizing the problems with AEDPA, many scholars have called 
for a reduction of the barriers to meaningful federal review of state 
prisoners’ cases and improvements in state postconviction review 
processes,62 although neither the legislative nor judicial branches appear 
likely to take these routes in the near term.63 Recent resource-shifting 
proposals, one by King and Hoffmann and another by Primus, take a 
different approach. In the most provocative and widely-discussed reform 
proposals within the current, expansive habeas literature, they argue that 
federal postconviction review for most individual habeas claims is a 
waste of resources that could be better spent elsewhere.64  
In light of the time-and-resource consuming futility of federal review 
of state convictions, and the fact that state courts generally, by their 
account, do a good job,65 King and Hoffmann suggest that all federal 
habeas review should be abolished for non-capital habeas cases except 
for cases that involve claims of actual innocence or the application of “a 
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 
review by the Supreme Court.”66 Beyond these two types of substantive 
claims, state prisoners under this proposal would only have access to 
federal courts if the state failed to provide a full and fair hearing of their 
claim.67 These prisoners would have to demonstrate that the lack of an 
adequate hearing so affected their case that the state had 
                                                                                                                     
 62. See Blume et al., supra note 20, at 447 (noting inadequate state postconviction review); 
id. at 454 (arguing that the “writ’s remaining capacity to impact individual cases” should not be 
discounted despite the “array of judicially and legislatively created devices that give primacy to 
states’ interests in finality”); Marceau, Habeas Process, supra note 12, at 169–70 (proposing an 
avenue around habeas in the form of challenges to inadequate state habeas processes under 
§ 1983).  
 63. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 833–34 (noting that their proposal would require 
a “comprehensive political shift in focus . . . from the back end to the front end of the criminal 
justice system” (emphasis omitted)). 
 64. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.  
 65. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 65 (arguing that earlier, more expansive federal 
judicial review drove states to recognize federal constitutional rights and offer better appellate 
and postconviction review).  
 66. Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 819.  
 67. Id. at 812, 822–23 (noting that their proposal echoes Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 
(1976), which barred federal habeas review of state claims involving the Fourth Amendment if 
petitioners received “‘an opportunity for full and fair litigation’ in state court,” but is broader than 
Stone in that it bars more types of claims, and also observing that the Court in Stone reasoned that 
federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims had no deterrent effects on state prosecutors 
and courts).  
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unconstitutionally suspended the habeas remedy.68 This would allow the 
federal courts to “restore broader habeas review for criminal cases in a 
particular state”69 if the state, following a cutback of federal habeas 
review, responded “by eliminating or substantially curtailing its own 
appellate and postconviction review processes.”70 This proposal partially 
echoes the earlier systemic theory of habeas offered by Paul Bator, which 
suggested that federal habeas review was duplicative of the thorough and 
generally adequate review already conducted by the states, though he 
acknowledged the need for federal involvement where state processes 
were inadequate.71  
Eliminating most non-capital federal habeas review of state petitions, 
however, is only part of King and Hoffmann’s proposal. They would 
divert the resources currently spent on non-capital habeas to state indigent 
defense,72 calling for a Congressionally authorized, “Federal Center for 
Defense Services,” modeled on a similar institution previously proposed 
by the American Bar Association.73 This nonprofit institution would offer 
“matching grants and other financial incentives for state and local 
governments to improve their efforts to provide defense 
representation.”74 As King and Hoffmann acknowledge in their 2009 
article, the “comprehensive political shift in focus . . . from the back end 
to the front end of the criminal justice system” that they envision would 
require additional funds beyond the savings generated by cutting back on 
habeas review.75 In their 2011 book, however, they suggest that the 
establishment of the Center could, perhaps, be a condition on the scaling 
back of habeas that they envision.76 
 
                                                                                                                     
 68. See id. at 842–47 (explaining that the proposed limitations on habeas remedies would 
be “lifted” if state appellate and postconviction review processes available to prisoners were 
substantially curtailed).  
 69. Id. at 843.  
 70. Id. at 842. 
 71. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 449, 451 (1963) (arguing that “the choice between the two 
[federal habeas review] arrangements must be made on the basis of functional, institutional and 
political considerations; and that neither arrangement can be validated by the assertion that it is 
logically necessary if ‘truth’ is to be established” and describing how “[m]ere iteration of 
process,” without a justification like ensuring that courts uniformly offer fair hearings, can do 
widespread damage to state courts). 
 72. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 101 (“A proactive federal program with the 
clear mission, and the funding, to encourage the states to improve their defense representation 
services offers a realistic promise of reform that case-by-case habeas review cannot deliver.”). 
 73. Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 825 & n.118, 828. 
 74. Id. at 828–29. 
 75. Id. at 833–34 (emphasis omitted).  
 76. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 101. 
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Similarly, another leading scholar, Professor Primus, has concluded 
that an individually-focused federal habeas approach, though desirable in 
a more ideal world, is untenable in the existing one.77 She argues that 
“[g]iven limited resources, complete relitigation of state court criminal 
cases on federal habeas is not feasible,” and thus substantial curtailment 
of federal habeas claims filed by state prisoners is necessary.78 She is, 
however, more skeptical of the adequacy of state criminal justice 
systems79 and would therefore retain federal review of non-capital cases 
involving systemic (not just individual) state violations of constitutional 
rights.80 To support these systemic claims, Primus would eliminate the 
requirement that petitioners exhaust their state remedies,81 and would 
provide petitioners with improved access to counsel.82 A new team of 
attorneys in the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division of 
the DOJ would be tasked with “investigating and challenging systemic 
state practices that violated defendants’ federal rights” and would review 
petitioners’ claims, picking those “most representative of serious 
systemic state problems.”83 Individual petitioners would, however, still 
be able to directly file claims of state systemic violations in federal court 
after notifying the DOJ of their claim.84  
Both of these proposals involve trading expensive, but mostly futile, 
federal review of individual cases for reforms designed to improve the 
functioning of state criminal justice systems. Neither, however, attempts 
to answer a critical question: what does federal habeas review of state 
convictions actually cost the federal and state governments? Without at 
least a rough estimate of the money at stake, it is difficult to evaluate the 
true extent of the problem or, relatedly, the feasibility and desirability of 
the proposed solutions.  
It is difficult, if not impossible, to defend the habeas status quo, but 
radically limiting the scope of federal habeas for state prisoners would 
have significant and long-lasting consequences that are almost as difficult 
to quantify. Most obviously, it would deny relief to the relatively small 
                                                                                                                     
 77. Primus, Structural Vision, supra note 4, at 5. 
 78. See id. at 5–6. 
 79. Id. at 1–2. 
 80. Id. at 5 (“The key to that reform involves reimagining individual petitioners as vehicles 
for redressing systemic or structural problems in states’ administration of criminal justice.”). 
 81. Id. at 28–35 (describing how individual petitioners would raise claims and the remedies 
they would receive if successful). 
 82. Id. at 36 (noting that individual petitioners would need the support of counsel and that 
providing each petitioner with counsel would be “extremely” costly).  
 83. Id. (proposing as “[o]ne potential compromise” the use of the Special Litigation 
Section). 
 84. See id. at 38 (noting one potential gap-filling solution that would “allow privately 
initiated suits to fill the gap”).  
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number of petitioners who could obtain it under the current system.85 In 
the longer term, it would also signal a retreat from federal protection of 
an individual criminal defendant’s constitutional rights, one that may be 
difficult to reverse even if needs and budget projections change. 
Nonetheless, if we are to evaluate current proposals for further curtailing 
the scope of federal habeas review in exchange for other reforms, we need 
to have an estimate of the cost of that review and ideas about how to best 
spend the capital saved by a more limited habeas system. 
II.  THE COST OF FEDERAL HABEAS  
Thinking seriously about the plausibility of major legislative change 
is a necessary preliminary to evaluating both the proposals described 
above and any future work along the same lines. To do that, we first need 
an estimate of how much non-capital federal habeas review for state 
prisoners currently costs governments, a figure missing from both King 
and Hoffmann’s and Primus’s work.86 This Part attempts to roughly 
estimate federal and state expenditures on federal habeas review of non-
capital state convictions. To be fair to the reform advocates, I attempt to 
err on the side of overestimating the costs. With at least a rough estimate 
in hand, it will then be possible to evaluate the likelihood of significant 
Congressional action. 
A.  Federal Court Costs  
To arrive at a working estimate of federal expenditures on habeas 
review of state cases, I calculated the proportion of all federal district and 
appellate cases that are non-capital habeas challenges to state convictions, 
and then applied this proportion to the relevant sections of the federal 
court budget. It might be argued that this methodology is flawed, even 
for a rough approximation, because non-capital habeas cases consume 
more court resources than other case types, but this seems unlikely. 
Federal statistics suggest that habeas cases, although occupying some 
                                                                                                                     
 85. See Blume et al., supra note 20, at 451, 454–55 (objecting to Hoffmann and King’s 
argument that federal habeas should be narrowed due to low success rates and describing 
“noncapital cases in which constitutional rights were violated but state courts declined to remedy 
those violations,” to suggest that we still need federal habeas review opportunities). 
 86. See id. at 468 (noting the lack of an “estimate of the federal and state dollars waiting to 
be liberated by the elimination of noncapital habeas review”). Nor have other accounts provided 
direct estimates of habeas costs; most assume high or low costs based on overall case numbers. 
See, e.g., HANSON & DALEY, supra note 34, at v (focusing on the total number of state habeas cases 
in federal courts, the processing times for these cases, and how processing times varied depending 
on the issues in the cases); Donald Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedure for a 
Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1043–44 (2013) (concluding that the cost impact of state 
habeas cases on federal courts is “minimal compared to that of diversity of citizenship cases” and 
§ 1983 civil rights litigation).  
2015] WHAT IS FEDERAL HABEAS WORTH? 1175 
 
court time, are not particularly burdensome compared to other cases. 
Non-capital habeas cases—from the time of the first docket filing to the 
termination of a case or the last docket entry—average 11.5 months for 
cases not transferred from other courts, with a median time of 8.1 
months.87 The median time for all civil cases, on the other hand, was 7.8 
months.88 Further, “about half of all noncapital habeas cases are 
dismissed or denied without reaching the merits of any claim,” although 
even deciding procedural default can be time consuming.89 Moreover, 
federal district courts assign “weights” to different types of cases 
“representing the average amount of judge time the case is expected to 
require” relative to other types of cases,90 and non-capital federal habeas 
cases receive a low weight.91  
Although federal courts have not labeled non-capital habeas cases as 
highly time consuming, the judicial resources that they require should not 
be understated. In a large sample of state habeas cases filed in federal 
court in 2003 and 2004, King and Hoffmann noted that magistrate judges 
reviewed more than fifty percent of them, which provided additional 
opportunities for petitioners to challenge court findings.92 Magistrate 
judges’ clerks devote additional resources to these cases, perhaps 
disproportionately, as prisoners are not required to e-file.93 Further, 
“[m]ore than one of every eight cases included an amended petition, and 
amended petitions generally require[d] an additional responsive 
                                                                                                                     
 87. KING ET AL., supra note 15, at 41, 43.  
 88. Table C-5, U.S. District Courts—Median Time Intervals from Filing to Disposition of 
Civil Cases Terminated, by District and Method of Disposition, During the 12-Month Period 
Ending September 30, 2012, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-5/judicial-
business/2012/09/30 (last visited May 1, 2015).  
 89. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 78–80 (noting that “it takes habeas courts up to 17 
percent longer, on average, to complete cases in which a claim was dismissed as defaulted than it 
does to complete cases in which no claims were dismissed for this reason”).  
 90. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-862T, FEDERAL JUDGESHIPS: THE 
GENERAL ACCURACY OF DISTRICT AND APPELLATE JUDGESHIP CASE-RELATED WORKLOAD 
MEASURES 1–2 (2013) (statement of David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice), 
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/091013RecordSub-Sessions.pdf. 
 91. Id. at 3 (explaining that 2004 case weights “are still in use”); see PATRICIA LOMBARD & 
CAROL KRAFKA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003–2004 DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY 5 
(2005), available at http://www fjc.gov/public/pdf nsf/lookup/CaseWts0.pdf/$file/CaseWts0.pdf 
(showing a weight of 0.54 for “§ 2254 Habeas Corpus Petitions,” as compared to, for example, 
0.75 for “Prisoner Civil Rights/Prison Conditions (Federal),” and 12.89 for “Death Penalty 
Habeas Corpus”); id. (showing lower weights assigned to prisoner litigation cases, including 0.44 
for “Deportation/Immigration” and 0.49 for “Mandamus”); id. (showing examples of the higher 
weights assigned to non-prisoner cases, for example, 3.45 for “Antitrust,” 1.41 for cases involving 
“Insurance Contracts,” and an unusually high 4.79 for “Environmental Matters”). 
 92. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 80. 
 93. Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 816. 
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pleading.”94 Hiring pro se and other support clerks and staffing pro se 
intake units also adds to federal expenditures.95 The preparation of pro se 
handbooks that guide petitioners through the process and other filing 
instructions, notices in multiple languages, brochures, and special 
websites likely also add minor costs in some districts.96 Ultimately, the 
time and resources devoted to state non-capital habeas cases in federal 
courts likely varies in large part by the judge.97 On balance, then, using 
the challenges to state non-capital convictions as a percentage of all 
federal cases to calculate the fiscal burden on the federal government 
seems a reasonable, if admittedly rough, approach. 
All of the costs discussed above—including the many costs incurred 
by these offices and clerks for non-habeas cases—are included in the total 
budget numbers described below, as the federal budget numbers used 
include judicial salaries as well the “salaries and expenses” of 
“supporting personnel such as the administrative and legal aides required 
to assist the judges” at both the district and appellate levels.98 Not 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Id. at 815 (footnote omitted). 
 95. See, e.g., DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS IN U.S. DISTRICT 
COURTS 12 (2011), available at http://www fjc.gov/public/pdf nsf/lookup/proseusdc.pdf/$file/pr 
oseusdc.pdf (showing that of the ninety districts responding, four have no “permanent pro se law 
clerks with substantial responsibility for pro se cases,” seventeen have 1–1.5 of these clerks, 
twenty have 2–2.5, nineteen have 3–3.5, twenty-six have 4–9, and four have ten or more 
permanent pro se clerks); id. at 11–12 (noting that of the ninety districts responding, in addition 
to their permanent pro se clerks, fourteen have no clerks’ office staff “with substantial 
responsibility for pro se cases,” fourteen have one staff member, twenty-four have two to five, 
sixteen have six to ten, sixteen have eleven to twenty, and six have more than twenty staff with 
responsibility for pro se cases). Twenty-five of the ninety districts responding indicate that pro se 
law clerks handle “[o]nly prisoner pro se cases.” Id. at 13; see also Representing Yourself in 
Federal Court (Pro Se), U.S. DISTRICT CT., S. DISTRICT OF N.Y., http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/c 
ourtrules_prose.php?prose=office (last visited May 1, 2015) (indicating that the unit does not 
provide legal advice to pro se litigants but receives all pro se filings and provides procedural 
assistance).  
 96. See, e.g., STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 95, at 11 (noting that eight out of ninety 
responding districts provide services like brochures, handbooks, and websites in other languages). 
Cf. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF CAL., PRO SE HABEAS CORPUS HANDBOOK: A MANUAL 
FOR STATE PRISONERS (2000), available at https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/Attorneys/FilingProcedures/ 
Lists/General%20Filing%20Procedures/Attachments/3/Pro%20Se%20Habeas%20Corpus%20Handb
ook.pdf (providing guidelines intended to assist litigants bringing habeas claims under §§ 2241 
and 2254). 
 97. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 321, 338 (1973) (noting judges’ varied approaches and corresponding attention given to 
habeas cases).  
 98. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, JUDICIAL BRANCH: THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 54, 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2013-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2013-APP-1-
4.pdf (last visited May 1, 2015). 
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included, however, is the appointment or hiring of counsel and experts.99 
It appears that few counsel are appointed for federal habeas cases: for 
non-capital federal habeas cases in federal district courts in 2003 and 
2004, “92.3% (or 2202) of the cases involved no petitioner’s counsel,” 
suggesting a small but perhaps non-negligible additional expense.100  
Turning, then, to the numbers: In the U.S. courts of appeals, during 
the twelve-month period concluding December 31, 2013, of 41,775 civil 
and criminal cases addressed by the courts of appeals, 5456 cases arising 
from the district courts were non-capital habeas cases filed by state 
petitioners.101 Of all of the cases addressed by the circuit courts in this 
time period, 30,078 were civil.102 Non-capital habeas cases arising from 
state petitioners therefore comprised more than 18% of the circuit courts’ 
civil caseload and 13% of their total caseload. During this same time 
period (the twelve-month period ending December 31, 2013), U.S. 
district courts received a total of 16,903 general habeas petitions from 
state prisoners.103 Table 1 summarizes these statistics.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 99. A full examination of costs would include appointments, as some habeas petitioners 
receive appointed counsel. See, e.g., STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 95, at vii (noting that in a survey 
of the chief judges of federal district courts (addressing pro se assistance for prisoners and non-
prisoner petitioners), more than two-thirds of sixty-one judges responding indicated that they 
appoint “counsel when the merits of the case warrant it”). But appointed counsel is relatively rare 
for state habeas petitioners in federal court. See infra text accompanying note 100. 
 100. KING ET AL., supra note 15, at 15, 23.  
 101. Table B-7, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Nature of Suit or Offense in Cases Arising from the 
U.S. District Courts, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2013, U.S. 
COURTS 1–2, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-7/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2013/12/3 
1 (last visited July 8, 2015) [hereinafter Table B-7] (showing 960 general (non-capital) habeas 
cases with the United States as a defendant and 5456 general habeas cases involving federal 
question jurisdiction).  
 102. Id. at 1.  
 103. Table C-3, U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit and 
District, During the 12–Month Period Ending December 31, 2013, U.S. COURTS 1–2, 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCUQFjAB&url
=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.uscourts.gov%2Ffile%2F10223%2Fdownload%3Ftoken%3DB3fLw
8BY&ei=j3idVdbWEYn3-QG2pJ6IBQ&usg=AFQjCNGZE4DxGpo0EkaHTyky-Iwvk37IDQ 
&sig2=O9wlyuxz2ER53NEUkJ2gEg&bvm=bv.96952980,d.cWw&cad=rja (last visited July 8, 
2015) [hereinafter Table C-3—December 31, 2013]. These numbers exclude alien-detainee 
habeas cases, for which 777 petitions were filed in the time period described. Id. at 1. 
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Table 1. Summary of state prisoners’ non-capital habeas claims 
filed in federal courts January 1, 2013–December 31, 2013, excluding 
alien detainee habeas claims and prison condition cases  
 
 U.S. District Courts –
petitions received  
U.S. Courts of Appeals – 
cases arising from district 
courts
State non-
capital habeas 
petitions 
16,903104 5456105 
Total of all
criminal and 
civil cases, 
including 
habeas 
382,593106 41,775 cases arising from 
district court107 
 
 
General non-
capital 
habeas 
percent of 
total cases
4.42% 13.07% 
 
As shown by Table 1, habeas cases are a moderate percentage of 
district courts’ and appellate courts’ caseloads. If one combines the 
general non-capital habeas cases filed by state petitioners—16,903 in 
district courts and 5456 in appellate courts—and the total cases in these 
courts—382,593 in district courts and 41,775 in appellate courts—
general non-capital habeas cases make up only 5.27% of all cases in the 
federal court system. The federal judiciary budget projection for 2013, 
including funding for the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals, District 
Courts, security, the Administrative Office, and the Federal Judicial 
Center, was approximately $3.84 billion.108 Of this amount, roughly 20% 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Id at 2.  
 105. Table B-7, supra note 101, at 2.  
 106. Table C-3—December 31, 2013, supra note 103, at 1; Table D-3, U.S. District Courts 
–Criminal Defendants Commenced, by Offense and District, During the 12-Month Period Ending 
December 31, 2013, U.S. COURTS 1, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-3/statistical-
tables-federal-judiciary/2013/12/31 (last visited July 9, 2015).  
 107. Table B-7, supra note 101, at 1.  
 108. See GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, supra note 98, at 51, 53, 56, 58–59 (adding $77 million in 
estimated 2013 expenses for the Supreme Court, $632 million for Courts of Appeals, $2435 
million for District Courts, $515 million for court security, $149 million for Administrative Office 
of the Courts, and $28 million for Federal Judicial Center). Excluded from this list of 2013 costs 
are amounts for care of the building and grounds for the Supreme Court and costs for the Federal 
Circuit Court, Court of International Trade, bankruptcy courts, probation and pretrial services, 
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appears to go to facilities and utilities, which are likely largely fixed in 
the short to medium term, leaving around $3.07 billion.109 If one assumes 
that court costs were allocated equally among various types of cases, non-
capital habeas cases accounted for approximately $161.79 million of the 
federal court budget in 2012.110 The federal government, however, is not 
the only body absorbing the costs of non-capital habeas review—the 
states’ expenditures must be estimated as well. 
B.  State Costs 
Ignoring, for the moment, the impact on states’ comity interests and 
other difficult-to-quantify costs of federal review of state habeas 
claims,111 the state costs of administering state petitioners’ federal habeas 
claims primarily arise from efforts to defend the claims and comply with 
various court requirements, such as delivering the full state record to the 
federal habeas court. Most states have an office devoted expressly to the 
defense of criminal convictions, and in some states a division is solely 
tasked with the defense of criminal convictions in federal court. In Texas, 
for example, the Postconviction Litigation Division of the state Office of 
the Attorney General “defends state felony convictions and sentences 
against constitutional challenge in federal court.”112 In Oregon, one 
section—the Criminal and Collateral Remedies Litigation Section—
litigates “State Post-Conviction Relief, Federal Habeas Corpus, State 
Habeas Corpus, and Psychiatric Security Review Board Cases.”113 Other 
states assign habeas cases to a few attorneys within an office with a 
broader mandate, such as a criminal or appellate division of the state’s 
attorney general’s office. In Colorado, for example, three attorneys in the 
Appellate Division of the Criminal Justice Section of the Office of the 
                                                                                                                     
and defender services, as habeas cases do not directly, or in most cases even indirectly, generate 
these costs. 
 109. Id. at 54–55 (showing estimated 2013 total costs of $5494 million for the courts of 
appeals, district courts, bankruptcy courts, and probation/pretrial services, of which $993 million 
will be for rental payments and $125 million will be used for communications, utilities, and 
miscellaneous expenses). Cf. Huq, supra note 14, at 598 (“Without changing fixed costs (of 
operating courthouses, paying salaries, running the judiciary’s administrative structure, and the 
like), substantial cost savings will in all probability prove a mirage.”). 
 110. This rough figure is calculated by multiplying the fraction of federal district and 
appellate court cases in 2013 that were state habeas cases (0.0527) by the court budget for 2013, 
excluding facilities and utilities. 
 111. See CHEESMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 40 (noting the uncertainty for states that is 
caused by federal review of the validity of convictions).  
 112. Criminal Justice Divisions, TEX. ATT’Y GEN., https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/cj/ 
criminal-justice-divisions (last visited May 1, 2015). 
 113. Trial, OR. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.doj.state.or.us/divisions/pages/trial_index.aspx 
(last visited May 1, 2015). 
1180 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol  67 
 
Attorney General, “work primarily on non-capital habeas cases.”114 
Louisiana, on the other hand, appears to employ a mix of lawyers from 
the state attorney general’s office, district attorney’s offices, and private 
counsel.115  
Many states do not track the amount of money spent on non-capital 
federal habeas or federal habeas generally116—in part, perhaps, because 
many do not have separate offices devoted to postconviction matters—
but a rough estimate of the funds they expend on non-capital federal 
habeas is possible.117 California’s Appeals, Writs, and Trials Section 
spent $8.54 million on non-capital federal habeas petitioners for Fiscal 
Year 2012–2013, $8.64 million for Fiscal Year 2011–2012, and $10.31 
million for Fiscal Year 2010–2011, for an average of $9.16 million.118 In 
the twelve-month period ending in September 2013 (the data that most 
closely matches California’s fiscal year), California prisoners filed 
                                                                                                                     
 114. E-mail from Catherine P. Adkisson, Deputy Solicitor Gen., Appellate Div., Office of 
the Attorney Gen. of Colo., to Samuel Wiseman, Assoc. Professor of Law, Fla. State Univ. Coll. 
of Law (Jan. 27, 2014, 12:50 PM); see Appellate Division, COLO. ATT’Y GEN., 
http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/departments/criminal_justice/appellate_division (last 
visited May 1, 2015).  
 115. Divisions Overview, LA. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., http://www.ag.state.la.us/Article.a 
spx?articleID=2&catID=0 (last visited May 1, 2014). 
 116. See, e.g., E-mail from Liz Brocker, Pub. Info. Officer, N.D. Attorney Gen., to Samuel 
Wiseman, Assoc. Professor of Law, Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law (Jan. 29, 2014, 9:48 AM) 
(providing—in response to an inquiry about the number of attorneys devoted to non-capital 
federal habeas cases in the state and the budget allocated to these cases—a general link to North 
Dakota’s biennial reports, without specific budget numbers, and indicating that this is the 
information that the state compiles); E-mail from Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney Gen. of Ga., 
to Samuel Wiseman, Assoc. Professor of Law, Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law (Jan. 27, 2014, 9:50 
AM) (noting that “[i]t would be impossible” to identify specifically how much money is devoted 
to non-capital federal habeas cases, as the state does not “have that type of information,” but 
indicating the number of attorneys in the state that handle all state murder cases, state habeas 
cases, and federal habeas); E-mail from William R. Stokes, Deputy Attorney Gen. of Me., Chief, 
Criminal Div., to Samuel Wiseman, Assoc. Professor of Law, Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law (Feb. 
6, 2014, 4:03 PM) (noting that the state does not track expenditures attributable to non-capital 
federal habeas but explaining that the state has one attorney who handles all homicide appeals and 
federal habeas matters).  
 117. The estimates provided here are from electronically available state habeas cost data and 
from state officials who responded to my e-mail, telephone, and public records request inquiries 
regarding state expenditures on non-capital habeas. After identifying telephone, e-mail, or public 
records contacts for thirty states (this information was not readily available for the remaining 
twenty states), I received individualized responses from individuals in approximately seven states; 
some of the information provided was not sufficiently specific to include in the data set. This is, 
of course, not a comprehensive or necessarily representative data set, although it includes a 
relatively diverse set of states from the perspective of geography, size, and the number of prisoners 
and habeas petitioners within the state.  
 118. E-mail from T. Maggio, Pub. Inquiry Unit, Cal. Attorney Gen. Office, to Samuel 
Wiseman, Assoc. Professor of Law, Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law (Feb. 14, 2014, 2:00 PM).  
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approximately 2921 non-capital federal habeas petitions, representing 
approximately 17.46% of non-capital habeas petitions filed by all state 
prisoners.119 For the period ending September 2012, California prisoners 
filed approximately 3443 non-capital federal habeas petitions, 
representing approximately 21.61% of non-capital habeas petitions filed 
by all state prisoners.120 And for the period ending September 2011, 
California prisoners filed approximately 3853 non-capital federal habeas 
petitions, representing approximately 23.22% of non-capital habeas 
petitions filed by all state prisoners.121 Extrapolating this data to the 
national level would suggest a total of $48.91 million spent by all states 
on noncapital federal habeas cases in 2013, $39.95 million spent in 2012, 
and $44.42 million spent in 2011, for an average of $44.43 million spent 
by all states.  
California may achieve significant economies of scale, however, and 
data was also obtained from less populous states. Colorado’s three 
                                                                                                                     
 119. See Table C-3, U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit and 
District, During the 12–Month Period Ending September 30, 2013, U.S. COURTS 2, 6, 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ve
d=0CB8QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.uscourts.gov%2Ffile%2F10198%2Fdownload&ei
=83qdVa-2K8jt-AH25b-ABg&usg=AFQjCNGG-gDbMiklMysE-ExOu7HsHYoBXQ&sig2=iU 
6bM2P23x-QIG9Md9o6Tw&bvm=bv.96952980,d.cWw (last visited July 8, 2015). During this 
time period California petitioners filed 479+770+1392+280= 2921 non-capital habeas petitions 
in U.S. district court. Id. at 6. Total state, non-capital habeas corpus petitions filed by state 
petitioners in U.S. district court for the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2013 were 
16,729. Id. at 2. 
 120. See Table C-3, U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit and 
District, During the 12–Month Period Ending September 30, 2012, U.S. COURTS 2, 6, 
https://www.google.com/search?q=Table+C-3%2C+U.S.+District+Courts%E2%80%94Civil+C 
ases+Commenced%2C+by+Nature+of+Suit+and+District%2C+During+the+12%E2%80%93M
onth+Period+Ending+September+30%2C+2012&rlz=1C5AVSZ_enUS615US616&oq=Table+
C-3%2C+U.S.+District+Courts%E2%80%94Civil+Cases+Commenced%2C+by+Nature+of+Su 
it+and+District%2C+During+the+12%E2%80%93Month+Period+Ending+September+30%2C
+2012&aqs=chrome..69i57.255j0j7&sourceid=chrome&es_sm=91&ie=UTF-8 (last visited July 
8, 2015). For this time period California petitioners filed 557+914+1594+378=3443 non-capital 
habeas petitions in U.S. district courts. Id. at 6. Total state, non-capital habeas corpus petitions 
filed by state petitioners in U.S. district court for the twelve-month period ending September 30, 
2012 were 15,929. Id. at 2. 
 121. See Table C-3, U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit and 
District, During the 12–Month Period Ending September 30, 2011, U.S. COURTS 2, 6, 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=
0CB8QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.uscourts.gov%2Ffile%2F10196%2Fdownload&ei=fH
ydVey3G8Pz-AH3goqIBQ&usg=AFQjCNEGv43ncgCKzsqgtn4P0Td4YOIAAA&sig2=F7Zbcwo 
RMmK2r2lmti51oA&bvm=bv.96952980,d.cWw (last visited July 8, 2015). For this time period 
California petitioners filed 712+1084+1726+331=3853 non-capital habeas petitions in U.S. 
district courts. Id. at 6. Total state, non-capital habeas corpus petitions filed by state petitioners in 
the U.S. district courts for the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2011 were 16,595. Id 
at 2. 
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attorneys assigned to non-capital habeas cases do not work only on 
habeas matters but devote about two-thirds of their time to them, at a 
billing rate (to other departments) of $94.95 hourly.122 Although the 
attorneys do not track their hours, the Deputy Solicitor General roughly 
estimates that they each works approximately 1800 hours annually, 
amounting to yearly expenditures of approximately $341,820 on non-
capital federal habeas cases.123 From January through December 2013, 
petitions from Colorado inmates represented approximately 1.59% of all 
state, non-capital habeas petitions in federal district courts.124 All states’ 
expenditures on federal non-capital habeas—extrapolating from 
Colorado’s expenses—would be $21.56 million.  
In Georgia, twelve attorneys handle all of the state’s criminal cases, 
state habeas cases, and federal habeas petitions, with four assigned to 
non-capital federal habeas petitions.125 Assuming that attorneys receive 
approximately $100 hourly (an estimate based on Colorado’s $94.95 
hourly cost and accounting for overhead), and that they also work 2000 
hours annually, Georgia’s annual expenditures are $800,000 annually. 
Extrapolating Georgia’s 3.38% of federal habeas cases from December 
through January 2013126 to the national level would represent roughly 
$23.64 million in total state expenditures on federal habeas. 
In Maine, one attorney handles “all . . . appeals in homicide cases” 
and “all federal habeas matters.”127 Assuming, generously, that federal 
habeas occupies 90% of this attorney’s time, this would mean that 
$180,000 is expended annually. Maine’s six petitioners amounted to 
0.04% of federal non-capital habeas cases from January through 
December 2013,128 which would extrapolate to $507.09 million in total 
state expenditures on federal non-capital habeas.129 The more modest 
extrapolations from the more populous states suggests that they do indeed 
achieve economies of scale. 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Adkisson, supra note 114.  
 123. Id. 
 124. See Table C-3—December 31, 2013, supra note 103, at 2, 6. In 2013, Colorado 
petitioners filed 268 non-capital habeas petitions in federal district court. Id. at 6. 
 125. Other states logged surprisingly low expenditures. Idaho, for example, appears to have 
spent only $1500 on non-capital federal habeas in 2013. E-mail from Kriss Bivens Cloyd, 
Constituent Info. Specialist, Idaho Office of the Attorney Gen., to Samuel Wiseman, Assoc. 
Professor of Law, Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law (Feb. 6, 2014, 3:31 PM). 
 126. See Table C-3—December 31, 2013, supra note 103, at 2, 6. In 2013, Georgia 
petitioners filed 338+142+92=572 non-capital habeas petitions in federal district court. Id. at 6. 
 127. Stokes, supra note 116.  
 128. See Table C-3—December 31, 2013, supra note 103, at 2. In 2013, Maine petitioners 
filed 6 non-capital habeas petitions in federal district court. Id. 
 129. Maine does not have a death penalty. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 220–22 (2002). 
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Oregon appears to most closely and directly track expenditures on 
federal habeas cases. The legislatively approved budget for its Defense 
of Criminal Convictions Program (DCC) in 2011–2013 was 
$17,361,631.130 For this same period, the section’s federal habeas appeals 
and Supreme Court cases131 required 3.05 full-time equivalents (FTE) in 
federal appellate court for attorneys, paralegals, law clerks, and 
investigators,132 out of a total 21.97 FTE for the section’s appellate 
division.133 Federal district court federal habeas cases required 4.62 FTE 
out of 20.14 total FTE for the section’s trial division.134 This suggests that 
federal habeas work occupies approximately 14.1% of the section’s 
time.135 These figures include time spent on capital cases but, during the 
period in question, there was a death penalty moratorium in Oregon, 
leading to a reduction in litigation.136 Assuming that all expenditures 
were attributable to non-capital cases and that federal habeas cases 
required a similar percentage of overhead and fixed costs, 14.1% of the 
2011–2013 biennium budget of more than $17 million for the DCC is 
$2.45 million,137 or $1.23 million annually. Oregon’s habeas cases 
represented approximately 0.84% of all non-capital federal habeas 
petitions in calendar years 2011 through 2013, and if one assumes, as 
with the states previously discussed, that Oregon represents 0.84% of 
state expenditures on federal habeas cases generally,138 the states 
combined might spend $145.72 million annually on non-capital federal 
habeas.  
In Wyoming, the Deputy Attorney General estimated in January 2014 
that “about 2000 attorney hours per year” and “200 paralegal hours” are 
devoted to defending non-capital habeas corpus petitions in federal 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Governor’s Balanced Budget, Defense of Criminal Convictions, OR. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.doj.state.or.us/about/pdf/13-15_doj_gbb_dcc.pdf (last visited May 1, 2015). 
 131. This assumes, for the purposes of making as generous an estimate of costs as possible, 
that all Supreme Court cases involved a federal habeas issue. 
 132. Governor’s Balanced Budget, Defense of Criminal Convictions, supra note 130, at 6. 
FTE for federal habeas cases required 0.47 FTE and Supreme Court cases required 2.58. Id. 
 133. Id. Projected total FTE is 18.65 for attorneys, 0.87 for paralegals, 1.93 for law clerks, 
and 0.52 for investigators, a total of 21.97. Id. The “2.58” in the “AY 13 FTE Resources” cell 
appears to be a typographical error. The total indicated in that cell, it appears, should be 21.97. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. Total FTE for federal appellate court habeas cases, Supreme Court cases, and federal 
district court habeas cases is 0.47 + 2.58 + 4.62 = 7.67 FTE. Id. Total FTE for the trial portion of 
the section and appellate portion of the section is 21.97 + 20.14 = 42.11. Id. 
 136. Oregon Governor Declares Moratorium on Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2011, 
6:04 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2011/11/oregon-governor-kitzhaber-
executions-death-penalty html. 
 137. Governor’s Balanced Budget, Defense of Criminal Convictions, supra note 130, at 13.  
 138. See Table C-3—December 31, 2013, supra note 103, at 2, 6. In 2013, Oregon petitioners 
filed 137 non-capital habeas petitions in federal district court. Id. at 6. 
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courts.139 If one assumes that attorneys and paralegals make $100 hourly 
(as with the Georgia estimate, an estimate based on Colorado’s $94.95 
hourly cost and accounting for overhead), Wyoming spends $220,000 
annually on habeas. From January through December 2013, the state 
represented 0.09% of all non-capital federal habeas cases filed by state 
petitioners140 and, making the same assumptions regarding 
representativeness as made above, this would suggest that all states 
combined spend $247.91 million annually on non-capital federal habeas.  
Table 2 summarizes the range of estimates of total expenditures by 
states on federal habeas by extrapolating from state budgets using each 
state’s total percentage of federal habeas cases filed by state petitioners. 
As described above, I have relied on estimates where hard data is 
unavailable, and estimates may of course be inaccurate.  
 
Table 2. Estimated total state expenditures on non-capital federal 
habeas as extrapolated from annual state budgets  
 
State Approximate 
annual 
expenditures on 
federal non-
capital habeas  
State 
petitioners: 
percent of total 
federal non-
capital habeas 
petitioners (in 
the year or 
years of 
estimated 
expenditure) 
Extrapolated 
total state 
expenditures 
(in millions) 
California $9.16 million 20.74% $44.17 
Colorado $341,820 1.59% $21.56 
Georgia $800,000 3.38% $23.64 
Maine $180,000 0.04% $507.09 
Oregon $1.23 million 0.84% $145.72 
Wyoming $220,000 0.09% $247.91 
Average -- -- $165.01 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 139. E-mail from Dave Delicath, Deputy Attorney Gen., Wyo. Attorney Gen. Office, to 
Samuel Wiseman, Assoc. Professor of Law, Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law (Jan. 29, 2014, 11:57 
AM). 
 140. See Table C-3—December 31, 2013, supra note 103, at 2, 6. In 2013, Wyoming 
petitioners filed 15 non-capital habeas petitions in federal district court.   
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The average of the rough estimates of total state expenditures on 
federal habeas, extrapolated from individual state budgets, is $165.01 
million, with a median of $94.94 million. The costs to the federal 
government and the states of administering and participating in federal 
habeas review, combining this rough average state statistic and the 
equally rough federal estimate from Section II.A, could be approximated 
at $327 million annually.141  
This estimate is intentionally expansive; due to the lower per-petition 
costs that appear to be achieved in the states with large prison 
populations, the state estimate, in particular, is probably inflated due to 
the inclusion of data from Maine and Wyoming, which together had just 
twenty-one habeas petitions filed in the sample period. Omitting Maine 
and Wyoming, the estimated state costs would be $58.77 million, for a 
combined state-and-federal estimate of $221 million. Nonetheless, I use 
the larger number to attempt to account for costs potentially omitted due 
to oversight, and, ultimately, to identify the largest amount of money that 
might be available to invest in improving state trials through initiatives 
like better indigent defense, if most federal habeas is eliminated.   
C.  The Difficulty of Habeas Cost-Cutting 
The rough estimate of the cost of federal review of non-capital state 
habeas claims to the federal courts and state governments shows that 
eliminating most federal habeas review would free up only a modest 
amount of funds for habeas reform in the best case. Moreover, although 
the best institutional model for enforcing habeas is perhaps debatable, one 
thing seems very clear: any proposed system that relies on prisoner 
petitions in any capacity will, like habeas under AEDPA, either fail, be 
expensive to administer, or both. The reason is straightforward: it costs 
prisoners essentially nothing to file lawsuits, and so they do, whether they 
have a colorable claim or not. This, of course, is far from a novel 
observation,142 and it figures centrally in King and Hoffmann’s work.143 
But both they and Primus fail to take it completely to heart, and as a result 
their proposals lead into what one might call the habeas trap. 
King and Hoffmann recognize that if federal habeas review is 
unavailable to most state prisoners, then ensuring the adequate 
                                                                                                                     
 141. This number is the sum of estimated federal expenditures and state expenditures. 
 142. Friendly, supra note 50, at 149 (noting “Justice Jackson’s never refuted observation that 
‘[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless 
ones’” (quoting Brown v. Allen, 334 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (alteration in original)).  
 143. Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 797, 848 (noting the “doomed strategy of post hoc, 
case-by-case federal litigation” filed by convicted defendants and arguing for a “new Federal 
Center for Defense Services” that would not rely on individual claims to improve indigent 
defense).  
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functioning of state postconviction review systems is both normatively 
desirable and, under the Suspension Clause, probably constitutionally 
required.144 Their solution is to allow individual prisoners to challenge 
the adequacy of their state’s processes, acknowledging that this “will 
prompt prisoners seeking habeas relief to [file]” and initially burden the 
courts.145 But they suggest that the courts will quickly decide what counts 
as an impermissible suspension of habeas by the states and will soon be 
able to “dispose” of certain claims “summarily.”146 As others have 
pointed out, this might not be true, and extensive, wasteful litigation 
might result.147 But even if King and Hoffmann are right that the prisoner 
claims will be resolved quickly, they will very likely not be resolved 
accurately over the long run. A federal court may give the first 
Suspension Clause challenge careful consideration, but in following 
years, as a constant inundation of petitioners allege worsened conditions, 
it will again be extremely difficult for the court to “separate the wheat 
from the chaff.”148 
Similarly, Professor Primus proposes that prisoners could “write 
letters requesting that the Department of Justice take their cases, and 
Department attorneys would pick the cases that were most representative 
of serious systemic state problems.”149 Additionally, she suggests that 
prisoners could file pro se petitions.150 Here, too, either the DOJ or the 
courts would spend considerable resources trying to sort valid claims 
from a huge pile of frivolous claims—many of them facially plausible—
                                                                                                                     
 144. Id. at 839–43 (concluding that it is clear under Boumediene “that substantive restrictions 
on the scope of habeas can survive a Suspension Clause challenge only if an ‘adequate substitute’ 
is available” and that their proposal “will not violate the Suspension Clause so long as the states 
continue to provide not only a rigorous and Due Process-compliant initial adjudication of guilt 
but also reasonable levels of state appellate and postconviction review.”). They note, though, that 
if states unreasonably curtail postconviction procedures, federal habeas review will expand. Id. 
 145. Id. at 845–46. 
 146. Id. at 846. 
 147. Blume et al., supra note 20, at 463 (“We have no confidence that the Suspension Clause 
issues Hoffmann and King frame would be resolved as quickly, cleanly, or finally as they 
envision.”); id. at 460 (suggesting that “the resources consumed in Suspension Clause litigation 
would dwarf those spent processing claims under the actual-innocence exception”); Primus, 
Crisis, supra note 14, 904 (arguing that petitioners would have “every incentive” to file 
Suspension Clause claims and that “[t]he only way for the federal courts to resolve these claims 
would be to conduct resource-intensive reviews of how each state’s procedures actually operated 
in each petitioner’s case”); see also Huq, supra note 14, at 568–69.  
 148. Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 814. 
 149. See Primus, Structural Vision, supra note 4, at 36 (noting that under “[o]ne potential 
compromise” to providing each petitioner with counsel, “Justice Department attorneys would be 
responsible for investigating and challenging systemic state practices that violated defendants’ 
federal rights”). 
 150. Id. at 38.  
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or they would give up, and throw the needles out with the haystacks.  
This problem is not unique to habeas, but it is unusually hard to solve 
in the habeas context. Professors Tonja Jacobi and Gwendolyn Carroll 
propose a loss of good-time credits as a way to disincentivize frivolous 
requests for postconviction DNA testing, but, as they note, their system 
may not successfully translate to habeas.151 DNA tests are both objective 
and binary, making the decision to impose penalties simple. On the other 
hand, determining whether a habeas petition is frivolous is both 
subjective and complex; given the necessarily modest nature of any 
penalty,152 any reduction in the number of petitions would likely be offset 
by the time spent determining frivolousness.153  
Thus, the best way to avoid the habeas trap is for courts not to entertain 
prisoner petitions, and instead to rely, as discussed above, on some 
combination of federal actors and nonprofits to make sure that state 
postconviction systems (or, in Professor Primus’s proposal, state criminal 
justice systems more broadly)154 are adequately functioning. As others 
have similarly argued,155 such a scheme, along with the possibility of 
certiorari and the theoretical possibility of an original writ, would 
probably survive a Suspension Clause challenge. But, as argued in Part 
III below, to the extent that avoiding increased federal intervention in 
state criminal justice is a key goal of a significant Congressional faction, 
replacing pro se prisoners with competent, better funded attorneys is a 
goal that likely cannot be achieved in the near term. If it is not, a large 
chunk of any savings would be sucked into the habeas trap. And at the 
other end of the spectrum, completely eliminating federal court oversight 
of non-capital state convictions would be both deeply controversial and 
quite arguably a Suspension Clause violation. Thus, it may be difficult to 
                                                                                                                     
 151. See Tonja Jacobi & Gwendolyn Carroll, Acknowledging Guilt: Forcing Self-
Identification in Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 263, 304–06 (2008).  
 152. A criminal penalty would require significantly more process, even beyond 
constitutional concerns. See id. at 268–69.  
 153. Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 22 (explaining AEDPA appeals of denials of appealability); 
Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 815–16.  
 154. Primus, Structural Vision, supra note 4, at 2–3.  
 155. Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 841 (arguing that their system of narrowed habeas 
review, which allows Suspension Clause challenges alleging deficient state postconviction 
procedures, “will not violate the Suspension Clause so long as the states continue to provide not 
only a rigorous and Due Process-compliant initial adjudication of guilt but also reasonable levels 
of state appellate and postconviction review” (emphasis omitted)); Primus, Structural Vision, 
supra note 4, at 39–40 (noting potential Suspension Clause challenges to her proposal for limiting 
federal habeas claims to arguments that states systematically violated petitioners’ constitutional 
rights). Professor Primus concludes that her proposal likely does not violate the Suspension 
Clause in light of the fact that the “clause clearly permits some restrictions on the scope of federal 
review of state court convictions” as shown by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and she 
notes the cases in which individualized review under her proposal would still be available. Id. 
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realize even the relatively modest cost savings potentially available from 
restricting non-capital habeas. 
D.  Non-Financial Costs 
The cost of federal habeas review of state convictions is not limited to 
the expenditures estimated above. This is because there are more abstract 
values that review impinges on as well, and to the extent opponents of 
federal habeas would give something up to avoid them, they must figure 
in the calculation. One set of criticisms focuses on the harms of federal 
habeas review to the dignity of state criminal justice systems, and state 
comity more generally. They suggest that “public respect for the 
judgments of criminal courts” is damaged by the fact that the case could 
be reopened at any time,156 and that federal habeas review is “subversive 
of a judge’s sense of responsibility, of the inner subjective 
conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the difficult and subtle 
art of judging well.”157 Accordingly, courts and scholars alike have urged 
a respect for states—comity—that allows competent state courts to make 
decisions about the constitutionality of detention.158 Relatedly, the 
annoyance, embarrassment, anger, and resentment that actors in state 
criminal justice systems may sometimes feel upon having their 
convictions questioned or vacated by a federal judge are costs as well. 
Questioned or vacated decisions also damage the federalist notion that 
states should have the authority to set criminal procedural rules within 
their borders. For ease of reference, I refer to these varied but related ideas 
as state sovereignty interests. They are undoubtedly important to the 
states, but, given the rarity of federal relief under AEDPA, the additional 
benefit of further reducing the scope of federal review may be small. 
Another intangible value undermined by federal collateral review is 
finality. Federal habeas introduces uncertainty and delay into the 
conviction process, introducing potentially “endless relitigation of the 
merits,”159 and, in so doing, impacts victims, communities, and 
                                                                                                                     
 156. Friendly, supra note 50, at 149.  
 157. Bator, supra note 71, at 451.  
 158. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973) (stating “[t]he rule of exhaustion in 
federal habeas corpus actions is rooted in considerations of federal-state comity,” which connotes 
“a proper respect for state functions” (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 334 (1915) (concluding that a state 
court decision may not be “ignored or disregarded” and that to do so “would be not merely to 
disregard comity, but to ignore . . . whether the State, taking into view the entire course of its 
procedure, has deprived [a defendant] of due process of law”); see Kovarsky, supra note 11, at 
454–56 (describing comity, federalism, and finality interests); J. Skelly Wright & Abraham D. 
Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding 
Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 903 (1966) (exploring justifications based in comity). 
 159. Bator, supra note 71, at 447.  
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defendants. Convicted defendants who know that they might have 
another means of challenging the legality of their imprisonment might 
not begin the important rehabilitative process because they are holding 
out hope of a habeas victory.160 This appears to still be true despite the 
abysmally low success rate in federal court. The fact that defendants take 
the time to file thousands of ultimately futile claims suggests that they at 
least retain some small hope of release. Knowledge of the opportunity for 
federal habeas review—and a false hope that this review might be 
successful—also might cause the threat of imprisonment to have weaker 
deterrent effects.161 Further, victims and their families waiting for a 
federal habeas determination remain in an unpleasant limbo, concerned 
that the individual they believe committed the crime will be released and 
will threaten further physical and emotional harm. Here, too, the paucity 
of relief under AEDPA has already reduced these costs. 
Although it is impossible to quantify these costs with any degree of 
precision, it is possible, for present purposes, to get an idea of their 
importance. States are not constitutionally required to provide collateral 
review, and many state postconviction review processes came into being 
partly as a result of states’ desire to insulate their decisions from federal 
habeas, which even before AEDPA, provided deference to some state 
decisions.162 The costs of maintaining these systems are fairly substantial, 
but some caveats are necessary. First, of course, states have always had 
reasons for allowing collateral review—correcting individual injustices 
                                                                                                                     
 160. See id. at 452 (noting that the “first step” in rehabilitation “may be a realization by the 
convict that he is justly subject to sanction, that he stands in need of rehabilitation”); see also 
Friendly, supra note 50, at 146 (concluding that collateral attack limits rehabilitation and that the 
argument that rehabilitation would not occur anyway, as prisons are not operated with this goal 
in mind, are irrelevant).  
 161. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (“Without finality, 
the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”); see also Andrew Chongseh Kim, 
Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final Can Further the “Interests of 
Finality,” 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561, 563 (summarizing the arguments in favor of finality, including 
the Teague Court’s deterrence conclusions). 
 162. See, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 20, at 441 (describing “a series of rules” for the 
“protection of states’ interests in the finality of their judgments” under the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts); id. at 445 (“[M]any states do not provide for the appointment of counsel to assist an 
incarcerated prisoner in a noncapital collateral challenge.”); Eric M. Freedman, Fewer Risks, 
More Benefits: What Governments Gain by Acknowledging the Right to Competent Counsel on 
State Post-Conviction Review in Capital Cases, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 183, 184–85 (2006) 
(describing the risks that states face under federal habeas review if competent counsel are not 
provided in the state postconviction process); King, Enforcing Effective Assistance, supra note 
12, at 2443 (noting that only a “minority of states . . . routinely appoint counsel in postconviction 
cases”); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus 
and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1043–44 (1977) (noting that even after two cases that expanded 
federal habeas, “state courts retained the power legitimately to resist lower federal court 
determinations of what the Constitution required of the state criminal courts”).  
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and providing systemic oversight, for instance—beyond avoiding federal 
review. These reasons may now be paramount even if they were initially 
not. Popular resentment of federal oversight of state governments has 
almost certainly decreased since the era of widespread school integration 
and prison reform litigation,163 and the rareness of relief under AEDPA 
reduces its sovereignty harms. Second, the mixed history of attempts 
under AEDPA, and afterward, to incentivize states to meet certain 
standards in capital cases, including appointment of counsel in state 
collateral proceedings, in exchange for fast track review in federal court, 
suggests caution.164 A number of states have attempted to qualify, but 
none has ever been certified for fast-track review, although this may be 
attributable, in part, to litigation and delay over the issuance of relevant 
standards by the Attorney General.165  
Further, the aftermath of Martinez v. Ryan166 and Trevino v. Thaler167 
may provide a small natural experiment on the value states currently 
place on avoiding federal review. As a result of those cases, states that 
have procedural frameworks that make it “highly unlikely in a typical 
case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal” cannot rely on 
the state procedural default doctrine to avoid federal merits review unless 
they provide collateral counsel for that claim.168 So, the states have a 
choice: they can “elect between appointing counsel in initial-review 
collateral proceedings or not asserting a procedural default and raising a 
defense on the merits in federal habeas proceedings.”169 Thus, whether 
such states amend their procedures to provide counsel for ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims, which will involve some additional 
                                                                                                                     
 163. See Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable 
Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 661–62, 708, 714–17 (1978) (describing federal court decrees 
in these areas). 
 164. In 1996, the federal government offered states an “opt-in” system for capital habeas, in 
which federal habeas claims for capital cases would be substantially limited in terms of the statute 
of limitations and the types of claims that could be raised if states met certain conditions that 
include showing that the defendant had adequate counsel. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–66 (2012); see also 
Doug Lieb, Regulating Through Habeas: A Bad Incentive for Bad Lawyers?, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 7, 7–8 (2012) (describing the original fast-track provision and the DOJ’s more recent 
proposed rules). Yet although some states took initial steps toward this opt-in option, none 
ultimately participated in the program. Blume et al., supra note 20, at 470–71. Several DOJ rules 
recently re-defined the conditions states must meet to receive fast track status, but these might not 
be enough to incentivize states to participate. See Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
No. C 13-4517 CW, 2013 WL 5692031, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2013).  
 165. See Blume et al., supra note 20, at 470–71 & n.189. 
 166. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
 167. 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013). 
 168. See id. at 1921 (quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320). 
 169. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. 
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costs, or instead allow the claims to proceed to merits review in federal 
court, will provide some indication of their willingness to spend to avoid 
federal review under AEDPA.170 In any case, for the moment, the most 
that can probably be said is that the non-financial costs associated with 
federal review of state cases are real and potentially quite significant. But 
given that AEDPA has already significantly reduced these costs, further 
curtailing federal oversight may not be a particularly important goal of 
the states. 
III.  THE PROSPECTS OF RADICAL CHANGE 
Recently, Professor Aziz Huq has questioned the viability of dramatic 
reform proposals generally, and Hoffmann and King’s proposal 
specifically, pointing to the Supreme Court’s historical leading role in the 
development of habeas, the unlikelihood of Congress acting at all (or 
acting at variance with the Court), and the implausibility of Hoffmann 
and King’s fiscal tradeoff.171 This Part builds on Huq’s criticism, lending 
empirical and theoretical support to the claim that significant legislative 
change is unlikely. 
As calculated above, state and federal governments might save as 
much as $327 million annually from the elimination of most non-capital 
habeas, though probably significantly less is more realistic. Based on this 
calculation, a tentative cost–benefit analysis of non-capital habeas under 
AEDPA is possible: although this program is unlikely to win any prizes 
for efficiency, its costs are not so disproportionate to the important goals 
it serves that reasonable people cannot think it worthwhile. That it is not 
an indisputable waste of resources in itself goes some distance to explain 
AEDPA’s longevity, but its relatively low cost also points to another, 
more subtle obstacle to reform.  
The most prominent recent reform proposals would reallocate funds 
to state indigent defense programs, or to the DOJ, to aid state petitioners 
raising claims of systemic federal rights violations.172 One could imagine 
other, arguably less judicial-resource intensive and more politically 
appealing proposals to eliminate most non-capital habeas in exchange for 
badly needed reforms to reduce wrongful convictions in state court. This 
Part suggests, though, that given even a fairly small gulf between 
AEDPA’s instrumental and symbolic value on one hand and its relatively 
minor impact on state interests on the other, the limited resources that 
could be freed up by further curtailing non-capital habeas would be 
                                                                                                                     
 170. See King, Enforcing Effective Assistance, supra note 12, at 2431 (arguing that Martinez 
is unlikely to increase the provision of counsel in state postconviction cases). 
 171. See Huq, supra note 14, at 595–99. 
 172. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 88, 100–01, 107; Primus, Structural Vision, supra 
note 4, at 36. 
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insufficient to bridge that gulf and spur reform.173 If this is the case, then 
dramatic reform is likely unrealistic in the near term.  
A.  A Small Price to Pay 
If AEDPA is indeed not all that costly—or is at least reasonably low 
priced for the value it provides in the form of a slim opportunity for 
correcting injustice and granting very occasional relief, along with 
whatever deterrence the threat of that relief provides—then proponents 
of federal habeas will be less willing to part with it. And while a precise 
cost–benefit analysis in this context is probably impossible, non-capital 
habeas, even as it currently exists, does not appear to be a terrible value. 
Based on Professor King’s research, non-capital federal habeas produces 
a roughly 0.82% success rate.174 Using the $327 million estimate from 
Section II.B., the cost per grant is $2.4 million.175 This sounds like, and 
is, a high figure. And, as Professor King documents, this accounts for all 
relief, including much that does not lead to a release from prison.176 But 
this cost must be considered in the context of government spending. For 
perspective, the total federal budget for 2013 was about $3.4 trillion,177 
of which roughly $200 million was spent promoting American 
agricultural products in foreign countries.178 At the state and local level, 
one estimate puts total yearly government expenditures at $3.2 trillion.179 
Of this spending, if recent trends hold, around a billion dollars will go to 
building stadiums for privately-owned professional sports teams.180  
                                                                                                                     
 173. Cf. Huq, supra note 14, at 597 (arguing that the “fiscal tradeoff Hoffmann and King 
propose is implausible and unsustainable” because “it is hardly tenable to posit that the marginal 
reduction in the federal budget from trimming 6.77 percent of the federal court docket will be 
substantial”). 
 174. King, Non-Capital Habeas, supra note 16, at 309.  
 175. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (noting 16,903 cases filed by state prisoners 
in federal district courts in 2013). At a rate of 0.82% of non-capital cases filed by state prisoners 
receiving grants of relief, see King, Non-Capital Habeas, supra note 16, at 309, this would 
produce 138.6 grants of relief.  
 176. See King, Non-Capital Habeas, supra note 16, at 311–15. 
 177. Barry Blom, How the Actual Federal Budget Results for 2013 Compared with CBO’s 
May 2013 Estimates, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/447 
11. 
 178. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, FY 2014 BUDGET SUMMARY AND ANNUAL PERFORMANCE 
PLAN 35 (2014) available at http://www.obpa.usda.gov/budsum/FY14budsum.pdf (noting 200 
million “to reimburse participating organizations for a portion of the cost of carrying out overseas 
marketing and promotional activities, such as consumer promotions” under the DOA’s Market 
Access Program). 
 179. JEFFREY L. BARNETT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: 
FINANCE—STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUMMARY REPORT 2 (2014), available at 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/local/summary_report.pdf.  
 180. See Patrick Hruby, National Freeloader League, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/nfl-money-national-freeloader-league-102965 
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With this in mind—even leaving aside the potential for relatively 
modest doctrinal change to increase the number of grants of relief without 
significantly increasing the financial cost, thus bringing down the per-
grant cost, and only considering the benefit to individuals—the value 
proposition is not so bad. Certainly, white-collar criminal defendants are 
willing to pay far more to ensure their rights are vigorously protected.181 
Professors John Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, and Keir Weyble—some of 
the strongest proponents of maintaining federal habeas—hint at this 
cost’s reasonableness, viewing the benefits of the current, flawed system 
as making its costs worthwhile, whatever those costs might be.182 They 
contest Hoffmann and King’s conclusion “that any negligible benefits the 
system does produce simply cost more than they are worth.”183  
Non-capital habeas is the principal and most visible means of federal 
oversight of state criminal justice, a remedy with historical roots so deep 
and deeply cherished that it is one of the few criminal procedural 
protections enshrined in the original Constitution. As such, it retains 
significant symbolic value in addition to the instrumental value discussed 
above.184 The availability of federal habeas process signals a federal 
commitment to the protection of constitutional rights, even if the prospect 
of relief is largely illusory.185 And as Professor Huq has recently argued, 
even when the Supreme Court denies relief, the Court’s habeas decisions 
may serve as a “catalyst” for criminal justice reform by bringing national 
attention to the issues.186 This reform is made possible by the nascent 
retreat from the extremely punitive sentiments that have informed 
criminal justice policy in recent decades.187 Moreover, for those 
convinced of a need for a more robust individual federal remedy, 
                                                                                                                     
_Page2.html (noting that the public spent $16 billion over a 14 year period to renovate or build 
professional sports stadiums). 
 181. Walter Pavlo, The High Cost of Mounting a White-Collar Criminal Defense, FORBES 
(May 30, 2013), http://www forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2013/05/30/the-high-cost-of-mounting 
-a-white-collar-criminal-defense/. 
 182. See Blume et al., supra note 20 at 439, 453–56. 
 183. Id. at 443.  
 184. Ira P. Robbins, The Habeas Corpus Certificate of Probable Cause, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 
307, 335 (1983) (“Thus, to the extent that a broad writ has symbolic value, any severe limitations 
on habeas corpus procedure drastically curtail both justice and the appearance of justice.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
 185. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 367 (1983) (noting that advocates “regard habeas corpus as symbolic of a commitment to 
constitutional values and to the ideal that no person shall be convicted in violation of the 
fundamental law of the land”). Cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, Acoustic Separation, 97 HARV. L. REV. 628, 
631 (1984) (observing that rules convey important messages to the public and to judges). 
 186. See Huq, supra note 14, at 601–02. This role is, however, likely more pronounced in 
the capital context, where cases tend to receive more publicity. 
 187. See id. 
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retaining the structural shell of that remedy is likely of non-trivial 
importance: if individual review were broadly curtailed, resurrecting its 
edifice would likely be a more daunting political challenge than loosening 
AEDPA’s strict procedural requirements and standards for relief.188 
Taken as a whole, then, even at its current low ebb, non-capital habeas is 
quite arguably worth the money. 
B.  The Difficult Calculus of Dramatic Reform  
If the current system is indeed defensible from a cost–benefit 
perspective, it blunts the case for reform somewhat; if it is not utterly 
broken, why risk the trouble and uncertainty of fixing it?189 But saying 
that non-capital federal habeas under AEDPA is worthwhile in a vacuum 
does not mean dramatic reform is undesirable. If a different system could 
produce better results at lower cost, it would obviously be preferable even 
if we might rather have AEDPA than nothing. But the low financial cost 
of non-capital habeas likely militates against sweeping reform in other 
ways as well.  
First, the relatively small amount of money at issue, regardless of 
whether it is well spent, is a reason to doubt it will be a Congressional 
priority. Less obviously, as King and Hoffmann have starkly 
demonstrated, non-capital habeas under AEDPA generates very little 
relief.190 Given this dynamic, its proponents may well place more value 
on retaining even AEDPA’s watered-down version of individual review 
than its critics place on eliminating it, creating a “value gap.” Habeas 
opponents have little to gain immediately, and the uncertain prospect of 
more petitioner-friendly jurisprudence in the future is unlikely to 
incentivize them to risk the immediate uncertainty of dramatic change. 
Moreover, habeas opponents are probably comparatively indifferent to 
the symbolic and catalytic values191 of habeas relative to the number of 
petitioners granted relief; indeed they may also value them. This 
hypothesized value gap, however plausible, is both speculative—these 
valuations can only be guessed at—and rooted in current realities.  
                                                                                                                     
 188. Id. at 544–47 (making the case that much of the futility of the current system is the work 
of the Supreme Court, which has created a “coherent” yet very limited avenue for relief in a two-
track analysis, and it can be relatively easily undone by future Courts); id. at 596 (arguing that the 
current system “is not the work of Congress, but that of a transient group of federal judges” and 
is not entrenched beyond modification).  
 189. See id. at 598 (arguing that the current system has achieved needed rationing of judicial 
resources in habeas, “arguably with some degree of injustice but with no obvious systemic 
failures” and that proposals for reform would produce “systemic difficulties for the judiciary”).  
 190. See, e.g., King, Non-Capital Habeas, supra note 16, at 309; KING ET AL., supra note 15, 
at 9–10. 
 191. Blume et al., supra note 20, at 453–54; see also Huq, supra note 14, at 601 (noting that 
court decisions can serve as “catalysts for larger processes of social and political movements”).  
2015] WHAT IS FEDERAL HABEAS WORTH? 1195 
 
The suggested gap is also simplistic—perhaps to a fault—glossing 
over a great deal of complexity in what we know about the legislative 
process in favor of a reductive conception of two negotiating parties 
whose preferences are uniform and consistent.192 But assuming it reflects, 
at least broadly, a key feature of the disagreement over the future of non-
capital habeas—tension between the protection of constitutional rights 
and the protection of state courts from federal interference193—we might 
still expect sweeping change if it could generate savings significant 
enough to compensate both sides for the damage to their interests. Under 
the Coase Theorem, in a world without transaction costs we would expect 
a hydroelectric dam to be built194 if it would produce enough income to 
offset flooding damage to neighboring landowners who could veto the 
project. Similarly, to use an extreme example to illustrate the point, if 
non-capital habeas cost a trillion dollars per year, reform would almost 
certainly occur, with the two sides using the surplus for other goals 
favored by their constituencies.195 In fact, as described above, the costs 
appear relatively modest, and thus unlikely to generate enough savings to 
make a deal attractive. This hypothesis is applied below to King and 
Hoffmann’s and Primus’s proposals. It is also applied to a third, arguably 
more politically appealing and less resource-intensive proposal that 
eliminates individual review in exchange for state adoption of reforms 
designed to reduce wrongful convictions. 
1.  King and Hoffmann’s Approach 
In their proposal to shift funds from federal habeas to the state level, 
King and Hoffmann understandably seek to address one of the clearest 
causes of injustice that emerges at an earlier stage in the state process—
the lack of adequate representation of indigent defendants at trial.196 The 
continuing failure by states to provide counsel at many stages of the state 
criminal process, beginning at the pretrial stage and continuing through 
conviction, causes ongoing constitutional violations and wrongful 
convictions at the state level.197  
                                                                                                                     
 192. See, e.g., Kovarsky, supra note 11, at 472 (discussing Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem); 
Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328, 330 (1950). 
 193. This is, of course, hardly a novel conception. 
 194. Leaving aside environmental harms. 
 195. Even here, strategic transaction costs, in this case legislative pathologies, may prevent 
the bargain from occurring. Intuitively, however, the greater the surplus, the greater the likelihood 
that these transaction costs would be overcome. 
 196. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 88, 100–01, 107.  
 197. See Tom Zimpleman, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63 S.C. L. REV. 425, 
445 (2011) (“Habeas petitioners are not only raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
more frequently than they raise any other claim, courts are also finding ineffective assistance of 
counsel throughout the criminal adjudication process and are using the doctrine to address 
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As King and many others have observed, representation at all stages 
of the criminal process is often substandard for indigent defendants 
despite the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright.198 Many defendants lack 
counsel during the setting of bail.199 Lacking counsel, indigent 
defendants, even non-dangerous ones,200 are more likely to have bail set 
at levels they cannot afford201 Many of them plead guilty even if they are 
innocent because their time spent in jail pretrial often exceeds the 
sentence they receive under the plea.202 When counsel is appointed, state 
judges often appoint deficient counsel.203 Additionally, public defenders 
deal with low salaries and caseloads too heavy to adequately represent 
individual defendants,204 and they are “denied the resources necessary for 
                                                                                                                     
constitutional violations that may not otherwise entitle a petitioner to relief. Ineffective assistance 
of counsel doctrine thus reaches almost any error that the defense attorney can make, plus almost 
any error that the judge or prosecutor can make, if unaddressed.”).  
 198. 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 793–94; AMERICAN BAR 
ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE 7 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/da 
m/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in
_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf; Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After 
Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2606 
(2012) [hereinafter Primus, Effective Trial Counsel] (“Everyone knows that excessive caseloads, 
poor funding, and a lack of training plague indigent defense delivery systems throughout the 
states, such that the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright remains largely unfulfilled.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 199. See Douglas L. Colbert, Coming Soon to a Court Near You—Convicting the 
Unrepresented at the Bail Stage: An Autopsy of a State High Court’s Sua Sponte Rejection of 
Indigent Defendants’ Right to Counsel, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 653, 708–09 (2006) (noting that 
“only eight states guarantee counsel at an accused’s arraignment or initial appearance statewide”).  
 200. See Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., Speech at the National Symposium on Pretrial Justice 
(June 1, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-
110601 html (“Many of these individuals [jailed pretrial] are nonviolent, non-felony offenders, 
charged with crimes ranging from petty theft to public drug use. And a disproportionate number 
of them are poor.”). 
 201. See Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really 
Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1719, 1720 (2002); THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 1 (2007), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf (noting correlation between bail amount and 
probability of release); Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to be Monitored, 
123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1346 (2014).  
 202. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2492–93 (2004) (“The pretrial detention can approach or even exceed the punishment that 
a court would impose after trial.”).  
 203. See Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal 
Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 789 (1997) 
(“In jurisdictions where judges appoint lawyers to defend cases, it is no secret that judges do not 
always appoint capable lawyers to defend the poor.”).  
 204. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National 
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1053–54, 1062 (2006). 
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a full investigation and the retention of necessary expert witnesses.”205 
And even under Gideon, defendants lack a right to counsel during the 
state postconviction stage.206  
As described above, King and Hoffmann propose to create a new 
Federal Center for Defense Services to study how to improve 
representation and give matching grants to state and local governments 
to further that goal.207 They acknowledge in their earlier work that 
additional funding, beyond the savings from cutting back on habeas, 
would be necessary to achieve their goals, and that this would require an 
“extraordinary political commitment.”208 Subsequently, they suggest that 
creating the Center might be a condition for eliminating most non-capital 
habeas.209 State and local governments spent approximately $5.3 billion 
on criminal indigent defense in 2008.210 Assuming that the estimate of 
the savings available from curtailing non-capital habeas is roughly 
correct, this would amount to only around a six-percent increase in 
indigent defense spending.211 Such a sum could, of course, generate 
meaningful improvements but it is arguably a modest sum relative to the 
perceived value of individual federal review—and, given AEDPA’s 
fairly small impact on states’ non-pecuniary interests, the desire to limit 
it further may not provide much incentive to significantly sweeten the 
deal with increased funding from other sources. 
Moreover, King and Hoffmann’s proposal for narrowing federal 
habeas jurisdiction is limited by the possibility of petitioners bringing 
Suspension Clause challenges to the adequacy of state postconviction 
                                                                                                                     
 205. Bright, supra note 203, at 787.  
 206. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). But see Primus, Effective Trial 
Counsel, supra note 198, at 2606–08 (noting that Martinez v. Ryan, which excuses state 
petitioners’ procedural default on ineffective assistance of counsel claims when the failure to raise 
the claim in the first collateral review proceeding at the state level resulted from a lack of effective 
counsel, might allow more effective federal challenges to state procedures and a closer review of 
“what procedures states need to have to give defendants an opportunity to vindicate their Sixth 
Amendment rights to effective trial counsel” (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012)). 
Contra King, Enforcing Effective Assistance, supra note 12, at 2431 (using empirical evidence to 
argue that “Martinez is not likely to lead to more federal habeas grants of relief”).  
 207. Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 833–34. 
 208. Id. at 833; see also Blume et al., supra note 20, at 468 (noting the unusual political 
commitment that would be required to create the necessary “massive amount of federal money” 
for the proposal). 
 209. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 101. 
 210. See HOLLY R. STEVENS ET AL., STATE, COUNTY, AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR 
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 6–7 (2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_s
claid_def_expenditures_fy08.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 211. The estimated $327 million in state and federal expenditures on federal habeas is 6.17% 
of $5.3 billion.  
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procedures, similar to the regime for review of alleged Fourth 
Amendment violations ushered in by Stone v. Powell.212 It is possible that 
complying with this command would be costly for some states, cutting 
into the available funding for indigent defense.213 The quality of state 
postconviction review is questionable, at best,214 and Professor King’s 
own recent empirical research suggests that this skepticism may be 
warranted: as she documents, pro se litigants and “paper hearings” are the 
norm in many states,215 and relief is rarely granted in most 
jurisdictions.216 Although petitioners have had little success under 
Powell, they may fare at least somewhat better outside the Fourth 
Amendment context, where, in contrast to Brady v. Maryland217 and 
Strickland v. Washington218 claims for example, the desire for accuracy 
in criminal justice cuts so strongly against them. If so, some states would 
be required to improve their procedures to gain the benefits of reduced 
federal habeas jurisdiction, which would likely involve increased 
funding. 
Any increased investment in state indigent defense would help 
improve state systems. But if the valuation gap hypothesized above 
exists, this proposed reform, which would be difficult to undo once made, 
                                                                                                                     
 212. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 822–23 (noting that their proposal would 
“operate something like Stone v. Powell,” in that it would preclude non-capital habeas review for 
non-innocence claims only if petitioners had received an opportunity for a full and fair hearing at 
the state level).  
 213. See Primus, Crisis, supra note 14, at 902–03 (arguing that the proposal will simply shift 
habeas claims to other types of claims and will still be costly).  
 214. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 12, at 298–99 (arguing that state postconviction 
proceedings must improve if they are to produce value in the federal system, and that providing 
counsel in state postconviction proceedings would help ensure that these proceedings were fair); 
Marceau, Habeas Process, supra note 12, at 145 n.210 (arguing that “there is good reason to 
believe that states remain resistant to providing robust state postconviction review that would 
approximate the protections provided through federal review”); Wiseman, Habeas, supra note 12, 
at 973–74 (describing deficiencies in state postconviction procedures). 
 215. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance, supra note 12, at 2442 (“Based on available 
information, the provision of counsel and hearings varies from almost always to nearly never.”); 
id. at 2444 (“Most states authorize the appointment of counsel for noncapital petitioners only if a 
judge first decides the case has merit or orders a hearing or discovery. In such states, only a small 
portion of petitioners appear to receive counsel.”); John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Gideon 
Exceptionalism?, 122 YALE L.J. 2126, 2138 n.71 (2013) (observing that “in many 
jurisdictions . . . inmates have no right to postconviction counsel”). 
 216. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance, supra note 12, at 2431. 
 217. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to 
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”).  
 218. 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (defining the duties of counsel representing criminal 
defendants and specifying that an inquiry into the adequacy of counsel must ask “whether 
counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances”).  
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is probably unlikely to occur because the available costs savings will 
likely be insufficient to trigger it. Until, as King and Hoffmann advocate, 
a “comprehensive political shift in focus . . . from the back end to the 
front end of the criminal justice system”219 occurs through other means, 
change is unlikely. 
2.  Primus’s Approach 
As described above, Professor Primus, acknowledging the 
dysfunction of the current system and the resources required for 
meaningful federal review of individual cases, proposes to limit federal 
habeas to petitioners alleging widespread, or systemic, violations of 
constitutional rights.220 To aid deserving petitioners, she calls for the 
creation of a new team of attorneys in the DOJ’s Special Litigation 
Section that would investigate and litigate claims.221 These new DOJ 
lawyers would be supplemented by a provision allowing private habeas 
attorneys “to recover reasonable fees from states that engage in systemic 
violations.”222 As Primus convincingly argues, systemic state violations 
of defendants’ constitutional rights are unfortunately common.223 
Dedicating a group of skilled counsel with the resources of the DOJ 
behind them, perhaps in combination with a fee-shifting provision to 
incentivize private counsel, to end these violations is an appealing 
proposition.  
Others have questioned how much savings Primus’s proposal would 
actually generate given its complexity.224 If the hypothesized value gap 
exists, then it would, depending on the details, inevitably ask too little or 
too much in return for the elimination of most federal habeas review. 
Hoffmann and King have made the latter criticism, partly on the grounds 
that states would resist being potentially subject to close federal 
supervision.225 And indeed, this is a real possibility; as discussed above, 
the current system provides such weak oversight that a sum in the range 
of $327 million could not induce them to acquiesce to meaningful federal 
supervision.  
On the other hand, a closer look suggests that the odds of such 
supervision would be quite low for all but the worst jurisdictions. Without 
help from the DOJ, it would be nearly impossible for individual prisoners, 
                                                                                                                     
 219. Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 833–34 (emphasis omitted). 
 220. Primus, Structural Vision, supra note 4, at 7, 26–27. 
 221. Id. at 36.  
 222. Id. at 38. 
 223. Id. at 17. 
 224. John L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong Solution, 1 CALIF. L. REV. 
CIRCUIT 49, 54–55 (2010) [hereinafter Hoffmann & King, Right Problem]. 
 225. Id. at 55. 
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who already struggle with presenting their own claims, to make out 
successful claims of systemic violations. And there might be little help 
from the government. The entire Special Litigation Section currently 
consists of forty-three attorneys divided among six practice areas.226 
Although these attorneys are among the most skilled and dedicated in the 
country, there simply may not be enough of them to play a significant 
supervisory role. The most analogous team of the Special Litigation 
Section, which deals with complaints against state and local law 
enforcement, describes itself as having investigated “dozens” out of the 
thousands of police and sheriff departments around the country, and lists 
only thirty-four separate cases and matters since 2002.227 On the other 
hand, this may dramatically understate their supervisory impact; it is 
possible that informal investigations lead to significant change without 
leaving an obvious paper trail. Professor Primus additionally suggests 
providing attorney’s fees for successful claimants in order to incentivize 
the participation of private and non-profit counsel,228 although this would 
be costly. 
If the value gap exists, however, Primus’s proposal is likely 
implausible in the short term, regardless of how the details are filled in. 
If there is a robust role for the DOJ and private counsel, the modest 
savings could not compensate states for the increased federal intrusion 
into their affairs. If there is not robust control—and even if there were 
initially, DOJ funding is subject to Congressional control229—habeas 
proponents have little incentive to discard individual review.  
3.  Another Possibility: Innocence Protection Reforms 
Ultimately, although the deterrent effect of federal habeas is difficult 
to quantify, in light of King and Hoffmann’s devastating critique of the 
status quo, both their proposal (even in a more realistic, scaled-down 
form as discussed below) and Primus’s might well do more to improve 
the functioning of state criminal justice systems than federal habeas as it 
currently exists under AEDPA. Nonetheless, the relatively modest gap 
                                                                                                                     
 226. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2014 PERFORMANCE BUDGET, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 2–3, 
50 (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2014justification/pdf/crt-justification.pdf; 
Special Litigation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/ (last visited May 1, 
2015) (describing the practice areas). 
 227. Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/police.php (last visited Mar. 16, 2015); Special Litigation 
Section Cases and Matters, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/findsettle.p 
hp#police (last visited May 1, 2015).  
 228. See Primus, Structural Vision, supra note 4, at 38 & n.208.  
 229. Cf. Huq, supra note 14, at 598 (criticizing Hoffmann and King’s proposal as unstable 
because future Congresses would likely not continue to fund the suggested indigent defense 
initiative). 
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between the value of the current system of non-capital habeas to its 
proponents and its non-pecuniary costs to the states suggests neither 
proposal is likely to gain traction in the near term. To illustrate the 
fundamental nature of the underlying problem, it is worth considering 
another, arguably more appealing and less resource-intensive reform 
proposal—limiting individual review in exchange for state adoption of 
reforms designed to reduce wrongful convictions. Despite the broad 
attraction of protecting the innocent, even this proposal would likely fail 
to bridge the value gap. 
Although it undeniably has served an important role in the historical 
struggles between different branches230 and levels231 of government the 
writ of habeas corpus has always been a means of ending undeserved 
imprisonment.232 As these struggles have, to a significant degree, 
subsided, it would be plausible, as others have suggested, to refocus 
habeas on this core purpose.233 And in recent decades, spurred by the 
advent of DNA testing, scholars and citizens alike have grown 
increasingly concerned at the possibility that our legal system convicts 
large numbers of innocent defendants.234 This is a deeply disturbing 
proposition. As the most terrible rights abuses of the past slowly recede 
from collective memory, the often more subtle problem of modern 
wrongful convictions has come to the fore. Despite its historic importance 
as a tool to combat wrongful detention, recently federal habeas has not 
directly played a large role in the protection of the innocent, and there are 
significant hurdles to overcome before it could do so.  
Calls for a greater emphasis on innocence in federal habeas have been 
common. Most famously, Judge Henry Friendly proposed a “requirement 
that, with certain exceptions, an applicant for habeas corpus must make a 
colorable showing of innocence” in order to, inter alia, “enable courts of 
first instance to screen out rather rapidly a great multitude of applications 
                                                                                                                     
 230. See HALLIDAY, supra note 5, at 134–36 (describing use of habeas as a means of limiting 
royal power).  
 231. See King & Hoffmann, supra note 2, at 51 (describing use of habeas as a means of 
forcing state compliance with federal law after the Civil War); Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 8, 
at 77–79 (describing the impact of federal law on state criminal procedure starting in the 1960s); 
cf. Primus, Crisis, supra note 14, at 907–08 (arguing that King and Hoffmann overlook the role 
of habeas in correcting systemic problems in state criminal justice systems); Hoffmann & King, 
Right Problem, supra note 224, at 54–55 (arguing that habeas is not designed to, and cannot, solve 
current systemic problems). 
 232. Redish & McNamara, supra note 5, at 1367, 1374.  
 233. See Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 8, at 80, 95–97 (arguing that states have internalized 
federal constitutional criminal procedure and calling for recognition of a stand-alone innocence 
claim in federal habeas); Friendly, supra note 50, at 160 (arguing for narrowing most federal 
habeas review, with the exception of cases in which a petitioner makes a colorable innocence 
claim).  
 234. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 820; see also infra notes 242–43.  
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not deserving their attention and devote their time to those few where 
injustice may have been done.”235 More recent proposals would provide 
a two-track model in which “petitioners who can demonstrate a 
reasonable probability of innocence would receive de novo review of 
their federal claims, free of the restrictions currently imposed by the 
habeas doctrines of procedural default and retroactivity,” while all other 
claims would receive only reasonableness review.236 And, as described 
above, King and Hoffmann would retain federal habeas review for 
petitioners satisfying AEDPA’s innocence gateway because “cases of 
wrongful conviction involve the most fundamental kind of unjust 
incarceration.”237 Nonetheless, there are serious obstacles preventing 
federal habeas from being an effective remedy for wrongful convictions, 
even as an “emergency backstop.” 
Critiques of the system and reform proposals, both old238 and new,239 
have recognized that limiting the scope of federal habeas to innocence 
claims will likely lead to a vast increase in the number of petitions 
alleging innocence: with little for defendants to lose, why not? This is a 
serious problem not just because of the associated costs in time and 
money, but because “[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious 
application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones.”240 In the analogous 
context of DNA testing statutes, for example, where the odds of being 
erroneously exonerated are extremely low, “[m]eritorious claims for 
post-conviction DNA testing are extremely likely to be lost in the sea of 
petitions” from guilty petitioners with nothing much to lose.241  
In death, however, AEDPA could conceivably do more to prevent 
wrongful convictions than it has in life. An evolving literature on the 
causes of wrongful convictions holds out the promise of relatively 
straightforward, inexpensive fixes. As evidence for specific reforms 
builds, the carrot of reduced federal habeas jurisdiction could, in theory, 
spur jurisdictions into action: in exchange for a state adopting a certain 
package of reforms, federal courts would not entertain non-capital habeas 
petitions originating in that state. 
Although there have been many valuable contributions to the 
wrongful convictions field,242 Professor Brandon Garrett has conducted 
                                                                                                                     
 235. Friendly, supra note 50, at 150. 
 236. Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 8, at 69. 
 237. Hoffmann & King, supra note 2, at 820. 
 238. Friendly, supra note 50, at 150. 
 239. Primus, Crisis, supra note 14, at 903–04. 
 240. Friendly, supra note 50, at 149 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 241. Jacobi & Carroll, supra note 151, at 269–70.  
 242. Jon B. Gould et al., Predicting Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471, 507 n.91 
(collecting examples). 
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perhaps the best known study—an extremely thorough investigation of 
the 250 DNA exonerations discussed by the Innocence Project and the 
causes of these wrongful convictions—suggesting needed reforms to 
avoid wrongful convictions.243 Explorations of these practices by 
Professor Daniel Medwed,244 Professor Dan Simon,245 and others,246 
combined with detailed recommendations for fixing them, identify 
similar themes.247 Many of the causes could be treated with cheap 
reforms, including, for example, the use of double-blind lineups, random 
photo arrays, and recording of eyewitnesses’ initial impressions,248 as 
well as the exclusion of unreliable forensic evidence by courts249 and 
requirements for full disclosure of benefits offered to jailhouse snitches 
in exchange for their testimony.250 
                                                                                                                     
 243. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011) (examining 
250 exonerations, identifying how criminal prosecutions can go wrong, and suggesting reforms 
that would help to avoid wrongful convictions). 
 244. See generally DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO 
CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 85 (2012) (exploring the prosecutor’s role in 
convicting innocent persons by analyzing pretrial, trial, and postconviction phases of trial and 
prosecutors’ incentives and practices within these phases).  
 245. See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 3–16 
(2012) (discussing errors in criminal justice investigations and suggesting potential reforms). 
 246. See, e.g., James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010) (exploring in detail psychological and scientific studies of 
errors and reforms proposed historically); Gould et al., supra note 242, at 482–515 (conducting a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of a set of wrongful convictions, identifying their causes, and 
proposing solutions); State Bar Association Creates Blue Ribbon Task Force to Study 
Proliferation of Wrongful Convictions, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N, (June 4, 2008), 
http://www nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=5941 (announcing the assignment of a 
task force to identify the causes of wrongful convictions from case studies and provide reform 
recommendations).  
 247. Some prominent scholars have expressed considerable skepticism about our ability to 
learn from exonerations or even to assess the scope of the problem, pointing to the difficulty of 
identifying causes rather than correlates of wrongful convictions and the unrepresentativeness of 
exonerations as to both type (they are overwhelmingly for murder and rape cases) and method 
(trial, rather than plea bargain). Jennifer Laurin, Still Convicting the Innocent, 90 TEX. L. REV. 
1473, 1489–95 (2012) (reviewing GARRETT, supra note 243) (noting the “near impossibility of 
isolating and assessing the significance of any single factor in a given case” and other data-based 
and analytical challenges); Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of 
False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 927, 929 (2008) (“[T]here is no systematic way to identify false convictions in retrospect.”). 
Other leading researchers are much more sanguine about the project. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & 
Jon B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning from Social Science, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 7, 29 (2009) (concluding that although many studies of wrongful conviction have been largely 
descriptive, there are also numerous empirical studies, and “it is not necessary to know the 
incidence or prevalence of a phenomenon to study it empirically or scientifically”).  
 248. See GARRETT, supra note 243, at 81–84.  
 249. Id. at 116–17. 
 250. Id. at 142–44.  
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These reforms, in light of habeas’s historical role in remedying 
wrongful detention, would make an arguably fitting exchange. And, 
given the general agreement on the undesirability of convicting the 
innocent,251 such a trade would perhaps be more broadly popular than 
(sorely needed) increases in indigent defense funding, hiring more 
government lawyers, or increasing payouts to plaintiffs’ attorneys.252 
Further, it would be possible to structure the proposal so as to minimize 
litigation costs: the task of determining whether the specified reforms had 
actually taken place could be handled administratively by the DOJ.253  
I do not defend the wisdom of this proposal because, for the reasons 
discussed above, giving up entirely on one of the few avenues for federal 
oversight of state criminal justice systems at a time when they are widely 
acknowledged to systemically violate defendants’ rights is probably 
unwise. Instead, the proposal serves as an example of a bargain that 
avoids some of the flaws in existing proposals and is apparently more 
politically plausible. Nonetheless it is also likely a non-starter if the 
hypothesized value gap exists. On one hand, it would sweep away 
individual federal review in non-capital cases, giving up the limited relief 
and deterrence the current system provides along with its significant 
symbolic value while making resurrection of a more robust, functional 
habeas less likely. On the other hand, it would require non-trivial federal 
oversight of the workings of state systems to ensure compliance, along 
with possibly expensive changes. Like increased indigent defense 
funding and reductions in systemic rights violations in state courts more 
broadly, innocence reform is badly needed. But because of the important 
values served by non-capital habeas, and the relatively small sums at 
stake, habeas reform is, at least in the near term, unlikely to be a 
successful vehicle for achieving them.254  
                                                                                                                     
 251. But see Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 65, 
75, 84 (2008) (arguing that while there is an “intuitive appeal” to viewing mistaken convictions 
as “evil,” reality may be more complex: “[i]mposing an unbridgeable firewall against false 
convictions . . . would visit unearned, grievous harm on vast numbers of innocent citizens, 
victimized by those guilty felons whom the justice system . . . wrongfully committed”). 
 252. See Huq, supra note 14, at 595–96 (noting the “appealing political logic” of reorienting 
habeas towards innocence); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of 
Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1645 (2005) (“Broadly speaking, 
legislatures are interested in accurate criminal adjudication, but they do not view zealous defense 
attorneys as the best way to achieve that goal. Accordingly, adversarial process will not be a 
politically sustainable means for assuring the accuracy of fact-gathering.”).  
 253. Cf. Primus, Structural Vision, supra note 4, at 36 (describing a more active monitoring 
role for the DOJ in her proposal).   
 254. Nor does the Supreme Court appear likely to drastically alter habeas law. It refused to 
extend Stone v. Powell outside the Fourth Amendment context even prior to AEDPA, and there 
is little reason to think it would revisit that decision now.  
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IV.  THE PRAGMATIC CASE FOR MODEST REFORM 
If the foregoing is correct, radical reform is unlikely, and AEDPA is, 
for better or worse, likely to be with us for at least the near term. If so, 
this does not call the value of far-reaching reform proposals, or the 
thoughtful criticism they provoke, into question. One of the great services 
academic commentary can offer is to consider possibilities beyond those 
immediately feasible, and to make us reassess the value of even our most 
cherished institutions. It does suggest, though, the need to focus scholarly 
attention on making the best of what we have.255  
Individual review under AEDPA may never be particularly efficient 
or effective at correcting individual injustice, deterring rights violations, 
or uncovering systemic problems—but it could be more efficient, and 
more effective. And, of course, numerous thoughtful proposals along 
these lines have been made. King and Hoffmann’s suggestion of moving 
disputes over prison administrative decisions out of habeas and into a 
more tailored process has much to recommend it.256 Blume, Johnson, and 
Weyble’s call to abandon the procedural-default rules that lead to so 
much arcane litigation is deeply attractive.257 Somewhat less modestly, 
Professors Eric Freedman and Larry Yackle have each called for wider 
availability of postconviction counsel.258 All of these proposals have 
merit, although each would require either legislative action or Supreme 
Court reconsideration of fairly settled precedent. This final Part turns 
briefly to an emerging problem, largely of the Court’s own-making, that 
threatens to further dramatically weaken review of state convictions. I 
and others have suggested a variety of doctrinal solutions, all of which 
the Court has yet to address, and for which the Court’s decisions since I 
last addressed the issue give a (rare) glimmer of hope. 
In Cullen v. Pinholster,259 the Supreme Court limited federal courts to 
review of the state record when addressing a claim of state court legal 
error under § 2254(d)(1).260 Access to state postconviction fact 
development, as well as counsel, is generally quite limited, and as a result 
records are often sparse and inadequately developed.261 Prior to 
                                                                                                                     
 255. See Huq, supra note 14, at 608 (concluding that “habeas will prove as recalcitrant, as 
obdurate, as Banquo’s specter” and calling for renewed scholarly attention to habeas doctrine). 
 256. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 2, at 47, 76, 81, 86–88.  
 257. Blume et al., supra note 20, at 472–78.  
 258. See FREEDMAN, supra note 47, at 151–53; Yackle, supra note 57, at 569.  
 259. 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).  
 260. Id. at 1398–99. 
 261. See Wiseman, Habeas, supra note 12, at 970–71 (noting a federal court of appeals’ 
dissatisfaction with a “sparse” state record); id. at 954–56 (discussing another state case with a 
shockingly inadequate record); id. at 972–77 (exploring other scholars’ research addressing 
inadequate state records and fact development procedures).  
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Pinholster, access to federal fact development was an important feature 
of federal habeas, particularly for claims like failure to investigate under 
Strickland or failure to turn over exculpatory material under Brady—
claims that often cannot be proven without access to extrinsic 
evidence.262 Absent some way to challenge the fairness of state 
postconviction review, Pinholster would allow states to clothe their 
merits judgments (which, under Harrington v. Richter, can be summary 
denials263) in AEDPA deference regardless of the process that produced 
them.264 Such a result would be a significant, and significantly unfair, 
blow to habeas’s (remaining) usefulness: if petitioners cannot generate a 
meaningful record of what happened outside the trial record, they are less 
likely to get relief or reveal flaws in state criminal justice.265 It would also 
be deeply ironic, given that, as Professor Lee Kovarsky has shown, the 
enacted version of AEDPA was seen as more moderate than competing 
proposals that would have granted deference to “full and fair” state 
adjudication.266 There is, however, some reason for optimism. 
As Professor Justin Marceau has argued, recent cases on the 
procedural default doctrine provide hope that the Court has awakened to 
the limitations of state postconviction process.267 In Martinez v. Ryan, the 
Supreme Court held that if a state requires defendants to wait until 
collateral review (where, unlike direct review, counsel is not 
constitutionally required) to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claims, non-existent or ineffective counsel will qualify as cause to 
overcome a procedural default.268 As with deficient counsel on appeal, 
with deficient (or absent) counsel in state collateral review “the prisoner 
has been denied fair process and the opportunity to comply with the 
State’s procedures and obtain an adjudication on the merits of his 
claims.”269  
                                                                                                                     
 262. Id. at 958, 989.  
 263. 131. S. Ct. 770, 784–85 (2011).  
 264. See King, Enforcing Effective Assistance, supra note 12, at 2449 (conducting an 
empirical review of state postconviction processes and concluding that, prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, “many prisoners had only the slimmest hope of securing 
counsel or a hearing, much less relief, for a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel” and 
arguing that this is unlikely to change); cf. F. Andrew Hessick & Jathan P. McLaughlin, Judicial 
Logrolling, 65 FLA. L. REV. 443, 454 & n.42 (2013) (citing Pinholster as example of judicial 
deference in habeas context). 
 265. Cf. Huq, supra note 14, at 601–02 (arguing that habeas can play an important role in 
catalyzing and organizing reform efforts). 
 266. Kovarsky, supra note 11, at 463–64 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Yackle, 
supra note 57, at 545 (“Democratic leaders resisted procedural restrictions as onerous and viewed 
the ‘full and fair’ plan as an effort to abrogate habeas corpus for state convicts altogether.”).  
 267. See Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive?, supra note 12, at 2149–54. 
 268. 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315, 1320 (2012).  
 269. Id. at 1317.  
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A subsequent case, Trevino v. Thaler, expanded Martinez to states 
where it is permissible to bring ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claims on direct review, but in practice, this is “virtually impossible.”270 
Writing for the majority, Justice Steven Breyer concluded that refusing 
to apply Martinez simply because a state did not require inadequate 
assistance claims to be raised on collateral review would create 
“significant unfairness.”271 Defendants who fit within Martinez and 
Thaler should be able to avoid the application of § 2254(d) and thus 
Pinholster.272 Perhaps more importantly, although they are narrow 
decisions and their likely impact is disputed,273 they clearly have the 
potential to be the groundwork for a broader attack on the fairness of 
postconviction process.274 And, building on Martinez, Professor Primus 
has argued that the adequacy rule, which requires a state procedural rule 
to be “be firmly established and consistently followed 
and . . . not . . . applied in ways that unduly burden the defendant’s 
exercise of her constitutional rights” in order to bar federal review under 
the procedural default doctrine, can be used to “to expose systemic 
failures in a state’s procedures.”275 Where deficient fact-finding 
systemically threatens the ability to bring constitutional claims outside 
the trial record, this approach may prove fruitful. 
Further, as I and others have suggested, there are several other 
potential routes around the Pinholster problem.276 Perhaps the most 
promising approach is arguing that a state court decision, even if legally 
                                                                                                                     
 270. 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1915 (2013). 
 271. Id. at 1919. 
 272. See Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive?, supra note 12, at 2143 (arguing that Martinez 
should allow petitioners to avoid the application of Pinholster because “when a claim is deemed 
defaulted, then by definition it is not ‘adjudicated on the merits’”). 
 273. See id. at 2148–49. 
 274. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (expressing skepticism that the 
Court’s equitable rule will remain limited to ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims); 
Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive?, supra note 12, at 2136–54 (discussing the implications of 
Martinez and Trevino); Eric M. Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State Post-
Conviction Proceedings After Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 596 (2012) 
(arguing that “the equitable rationale of Martinez should apply to a number of claims other than 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel”); Wiseman, Habeas, supra note 12, at 989 (“Although 
Martinez is narrowly focused on the right to effective trial counsel, its holding is based, inter alia, 
on the fact that a ‘prisoner is in no position to develop the evidentiary basis for a claim of 
ineffective assistance, which often turns on evidence outside the trial record.’” (quoting Martinez, 
132 S. Ct. at 1317)).  
 275. Primus, Effective Trial Counsel, supra note 198, at 2607, 2620; see also Marceau, Is 
Guilt Dispositive?, supra note 12, at 2128 (noting that Primus’s “work brings deserved attention 
to the adequacy doctrine”). 
 276. See Wiseman, Habeas, supra note 12, at 992–1000 (discussing other potential 
arguments, including due process and Suspension Clause approaches); Marceau, Habeas Process, 
supra note 12, at 169–70 (discussing challenges to the adequacy of state processes). 
1208 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol  67 
 
reasonable under § 2254(d)(1) on the basis of the record, is nonetheless 
“an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence,” 
opening the door to federal fact finding and, potentially, relief.277 This 
argument has the advantage of having a sound statutory anchor, as well 
as the ability to address extraordinary failures in individual cases.278 It 
has also found some success in the lower courts. As Judge Alex Kozinski 
has argued, unreasonable determinations might occur when “the fact-
finding process itself is defective.”279  
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, but a petition for 
certiorari in Hurles v. Ryan,280 a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, has been re-listed twenty-three times as of 
December 1, 2014.281 Even if the Court does not reject the argument 
entirely (when and if it decides to consider it), it may well limit the 
argument, consistent with its recent interpretation of reasonableness 
under § 2254(d), to decisions denying fact development that “no 
fairminded jurist” could have made.282 Even that standard would correct 
some of the worst problems,283 but the better approach, in light of 
AEDPA’s legislative history, would be to require at least that the 
proceeding be “full and fair.”284 Ominously, the Hurles petition presents 
the question of whether “state court adjudications [are] per se 
unreasonable and not entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) 
merely because the state court does not conduct an evidentiary 
hearing.”285 Still, Martinez and Thaler provide some reason for 
                                                                                                                     
 277. See Wiseman, Habeas, supra note 12, at 979 n.141, 984–85 (internal quotation marks 
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 280. 706 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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state. See Huq, supra note 14, at 528. 
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Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 443 (1996) (arguing 
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 285. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Hurles v. Ryan, No. 12-1472 (June 17, 2013), 2013 
WL 3076565.  
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optimism—and regardless of the result in Hurles, if any, the need for a 
variety of solutions to adapt federal habeas to identify and respond to the 
failures of state postconviction process will remain. Radical reform of 
any sort is probably unlikely in the near term. It is critical, then, to make 
the best of AEDPA.  
Federal habeas may never be the powerful agent of change it once 
was. But with relatively modest changes, it easily could be more useful 
than it currently is.  
CONCLUSION 
If, as Professor Huq suggests, “[s]cholars have fallen out of love with 
habeas,”286 the disenchantment is understandable. For an entire 
generation of legal academics concerned about the protection of state 
court defendants’ constitutional rights, federal habeas has provided little 
of which to be enamored. AEDPA is restrictive enough on its face, and 
most Supreme Court terms seem to place a new, more restrictive gloss on 
it.287 This is deeply frustrating. In light of our collective wealth and our 
apparently low threshold for parting with it, it is tempting to think that if 
our current system of federal collateral review of non-capital state 
convictions is broken—and it is hard to argue that it is not—then the 
solution is to fix it, even if it costs a little more. Eliminating barriers to 
substantive review, providing postconviction counsel,288 appointing more 
judges, and hiring more judicial staff would be expensive, but not 
ruinously so, and not even in the same league, as, say, farm subsidies.289 
For the safeguarding of constitutional rights and a last, federal check 
against miscarriages of justice, it seems like a price we should be willing 
and able to pay, even if, for the reasons described above, backend review 
is never likely to be especially efficient. At the front end of the process, 
the argument is even more compelling. We know that the states are failing 
to provide adequate funding for indigent defense, and that this has 
devastating consequences.290 For a fraction of the federal budget, we 
could dramatically improve the quality of indigent representation.291 For 
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vastly less, we could fund a new initiative by the DOJ to address systemic 
problems in state justice systems.292 Nothing in this Article is meant to 
suggest that doing any or all of these things would not be money well 
spent. 
But we seem unlikely to do any of them, at least in the near term. 
Realistically, we will probably not invest significant new money in truly 
meaningful postconviction review or adequate representation for the 
poor. Given the scarcity of criminal justice resources, allocating them 
efficiently is important. For this reason, federal review of state 
convictions under AEDPA has been, and will probably continue to be, a 
target of resource-shifting proposals. But individual federal review of 
state convictions, even under AEDPA, has value, not just to a lucky few 
defendants, but also as a symbol of our commitment to the protection of 
constitutional rights and, more importantly, the potential to once again be 
more than a symbol. If eliminating individual review could generate huge 
savings, it might be both plausible and desirable. But, as shown above, it 
cannot, and it probably is not. AEDPA may be terrible, but it is ours, and 
making it less terrible—or at least not more terrible—is a worthwhile 
project. 
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